Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 1

11-1-1987

"An Exuberance of Prerogative" - The Application of Ill. Rev. Stat.
Ch. 110, Para. 2-611 and/or the Contempt Sanction to Attorney
Disciplinary Proceedings in Illinois
Susan W. Brenner
Jack S. Craven

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Susan W. Brenner and Jack S. Craven, "An Exuberance of Prerogative" - The Application of Ill. Rev. Stat.
Ch. 110, Para. 2-611 and/or the Contempt Sanction to Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings in Illinois, 8 N. Ill.
U. L. Rev. 67 (1987).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

"An Exuberance of Prerogative"'?-The

Application of ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 110,

para. 2-611 and/or the Contempt

Sanction to Attorney Disciplinary
Proceedings in Illinois
SusAN W. BRENNER*
JACK S. CRAVEN**

I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 15, 1987, John Smith, who had formerly been
admitted to practice law but who had been disbarred several years
earlier, filed a petition for reinstatement to the Illinois bar with the
Illinois Supreme Court. 2 The petition was assigned a Supreme Court
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* Susan W. Brenner is an associate with the firm of Silets and Martin, Ltd.
She received her J.D. from Indiana University in 1981, taught at the Indiana
University law school for two years and then clerked for a federal judge, after which
she practiced with the firm of Shellow, Shellow & Glynn in Milwaukee for one year.
She has graduate degrees in sociology and, prior to attending law school, taught
sociology at the undergraduate and graduate levels, specializing in criminology. She
has authored and co-authored approximately twenty law review articles on issues in
criminal law and criminal sanctions; with Harvey M. Silets, she co-authored the
chapter on "Post-Trial Motions" in IICLE's Federal Criminal Practice (1987).
** Jack S. Craven is a legal intern with the firm of Silets and Martin, Ltd.
He is a third year law student at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. He has
undergraduate degrees in political science and criminal justice from Indiana University.
The authors would like to express their thanks to Ms. Cheryl Marquardt, whose
tireless efforts were of invaluable assistance in the research involved in the preparation
of this article.
2. Petitions for reinstatement as an attorney licensed to practice in Illinois are
governed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 767 (1985), which provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
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docket number, and the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission commenced a routine inquiry into the merits of Mr. Smith's
request for reinstatement. 3 On May 31, 1987, after the inquiry had

An attorney who has been disbarred, disbarred on consent or suspended
until further order of the court may file his verified petition with the clerk
of the court seeking to be reinstated to the roll of attorneys admitted to
practice law in this State. No petition shall be filed within a period of five
years after the date of an order of disbarment, three years after the date of
an order allowing disbarment on consent, two years after the date of an
order denying a petition for reinstatement, or one year after an order
allowing the petition for reinstatement to be withdrawn. No petition for
reinstatement shall be filed by an attorney suspended for a specified period
and until further order of the court, until the specified period of time has
elapsed. The petition shall include the information specified by Commission
rule.
ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 767(a) (1985) [hereinafter the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules contained in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A will be referred to as Supreme Court
Rules].
3. Supreme Court Rule 767(b) provides that "[an attorney who has been
disbarred, disbarred on consent or suspended until further order of the court may
present to the Administrator [of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission] a copy of the petition he proposes to file with the clerk within 120 days prior
to the date on which the petition may be filed." See supra note 1. After the petition
has been filed with the Supreme Court, it is "referred to a hearing panel." Supreme
Court Rule 767(0. "When a disciplinary case reaches the Supreme Court it is given
a 'Miscellaneous Record' number (MR number) by the Clerk of the court. If
exceptions are filed by the attorney or ... by the Administrator, the case moves
from the miscellaneous record docket onto the general docket and is tracked just like
a regular case." J. BASSITT, ATTORNEY CONDUCT 2-17 (IICLE, 1985).
Supreme Court Rule 751 established the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission [hereinafter, "ARDC"], and Supreme Court Rule 753(c) created a
Hearing Board within the ARDC. The Board conducts hearings on disciplinary
complaints and on petitions for reinstatement. Supreme Court Rule 753(c)(3); see
also Rules of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, Rule 413
("Within 14 days after receipt of a copy of the petition, the Chair of the Hearing
Board shall assign the case to a hearing panel and set the date for the hearing.")
After hearing evidence on matters which have been referred to it, the Hearing Board
"make[s] findings of fact and conclusions of fact and law, together with a recommendation" which is sent to a Review Board. Supreme Court Rule 753(c)(3),
753(d)(1). The "[piroceedings before the [Hearing] Board [are] conducted according
to the practice in civil cases as modified by rules promulgated by the [ARDC]
pursuant to [Supreme Court] Rule 75 1(a)." Supreme Court Rule 753(c)(5).
Supreme Court Rule 751(a) provides that "[tihe registration of, and disciplinary
proceedings affecting, members of the Illinois bar shall be under the administrative
supervision of an Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission." Supreme
Court Rule 751(e)(1) provides that "[t]he Commission shall ... make rules for
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been in progress for several months, Mr. Smith filed a motion for
leave to withdraw his petition for reinstatement.
Approximately two weeks after the filing of this motion, the
Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a motion with the Supreme Court in which he sought to
have sanctions imposed against Mr. Smith and the attorneys who had
represented him in the drafting and filing of the petition; the request
for sanctions was predicated upon the recently revised Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure §2-611,4 which permits the imposition of sanctions
for the act of filing a frivolous pleading.' The Administrator's motion
also sought the issuance of a rule to show cause why Mr. Smith and
his attorneys should not be held in contempt of court for filing a
false and fraudulent pleading.
The ficticious scenario presented above is based upon an actual
proceeding which was before the Illinois Supreme Court in 1987.6 As

disciplinary proceedings [that are] not inconsistent with the rules of [the Illinois
Supreme Court]."
Acting pursuant to the authority conferred by the above provisions, the ARDC
has promulgated rules governing practice before the Hearing Board and the procedures involved in determining the merits of a petition for reinstatement submitted
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 767. See Rules of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission [hereinafter, "ARDC Rules"] Rules 201-291 (Hearing Board),
Rules 401-414 (Petitions for Reinstatement). ARDC Rule 401 prescribes the form of
a petition for reinstatement, while ARDC Rule 402 lists twenty-five specific categories
of information which must be disclosed in the petition. ARDC Rule 414 provides
that "[t]he Administrator shall conduct an investigation into any matter raised by
the petition and may file written objections to the petition."
For a discussion of the procedural aspects of attorney registration and discipline
in Illinois, see J. BAssrrT, ATTORNEY CONDUCT 2-4.to 2-17 (IICLE 1985); Murphy,
A Short History of Disciplinary Procedures in Illinois, 60 ILL. BAR J. 528 (March,
1972); Saikley, The DisciplinaryProcedureof the Illinois State Bar Association Under
Rule 59 of the Supreme Court, 52 ILL. BAR J. 912 (July, 1964).
4. For a discussion of the provision, see infra Section II.
5. The factual predicate is not explicated in the above scenario for the reason
that the fraudulence or factual impeccability of the Smith petition is truly irrelevant
to the legal issues which are under consideration in this article. Section III, infra,
does postulate that the Smith petition might have been factually imperfect in certain
respects, but this postulate is articulated only as a device to assist in the analysis of
the contempt sanction which is presented in that section. It is also important to note
that, in moving for sanctions, the Administrator also responded to Mr. Smith's
motion to withdraw the petition for reinstatement by stating that he had no objection
to the motion and, in point of fact, recommended that it be granted.
6. See In re W. Jason Mitan, Supreme Court M.R. 4172, slip op. (Dec. 30,
1987).
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may be apparent from the scenario, 7 certain novel issues arose- from
this proceeding that are likely to have important consequences for
practice in Illinois attorney disciplinary matters and, perhaps, for
practice in other areas as well. The issues which are likely to be of
the most profound significance are (a) the application of Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (hereinafter Rule 2-6i 1) to Illinois attorney
disciplinary proceedings; and (b) the use of the contempt power as an
alternative and/or adjunct to the sanctioning authority conferred by
Rule 2-611.
This article explores both of these issues in the context from
which they arose, analyzing the permissibility of the relief sought in
the Administrator's motion and the significance of the Administrator's
action in requesting such relief. The article is presented in the following sections: Section II discusses the recently-amended provisions of
Rule 2-611 and the statute's applicability to Illinois disciplinary proceedings; Section III examines the use of the court's contempt power
as an alternative and/or additional sanction to be directed against
unsatisfactory pleadings which are filed in such proceedings; and
Section IV offers a brief conclusion which summarizes the analysis
presented in each of the two preceding sections.

II.

ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110,

PARA.

2-611

Until November of 1986, Rule 2-611 merely allowed the court to
assess "reasonable expenses" and attorneys' fees against a party who
was found to have filed an "untrue pleading" in a civil proceeding.8
Public Act 84-1431 substantially revised Rule 2-611 by incorporating
7. Although the scenario was suggested by the pleadings which were filed in

an actual Supreme Court proceeding, the authors have elected to predicate this article
upon a hypothetical scenario for the reason that a fictional example provides more
flexibility in articulating a factual analysis that is most capable of illustrating the
propositions which are at issue. The fact that the factual predicate for the article was
suggested by an actual case should not be taken as indicating that any of the facts
adduced in the scenario analyzed herein reflect the circumstances at issue in that
proceeding and, indeed, the authors hereby disclaim any intrinsic factual similarities
between their scenario and In re W. Jason Mitan, supra. What the authors have
done is to extract certain of the legal issues involved in that proceeding and to
construct a scenario which permits their exploration in an optimal analytical context.
8. The measure provided, in pertinent part, that "[aIllegations and denials [in
pleadings], made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue, shall subject the
party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the
other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee, to be summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within 30 days of the
judgment or dismissal." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1981) (prior to revision).
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the language of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, almost verbatim,
into the Illinois provision. 9 As amended, Rule 2-611 governs the
"Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers" and provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated.
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and beliefformed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. * . . If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this Section, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a representedparty, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party of parties the amount of the reasonableexpenses
incurredbecause of the filing of the pleading, motion or other
0
paper, including a reasonableattorney'sfee. i
9. See, e.g., Public Act 84-1431, reprinted in WEST'S ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE
1986 LAWS - 84TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REGULAR SESSION (P.A. 84-1406 to

SERVICE:

84-1431) at 281-82.
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1981) (emphasis added). The revised
Rule 2-611 also includes provisions concerning the imposition of sanctions upon an
insurance company on whose behalf an improper "pleading, motion or other paper"
is filed, and retains the final two paragraphs of its predecessor, which concern the
applicability of the provision to "the State of Illinois or any agency thereof" and
the procedure "[wihere the litigation involves review of a determination of an
administrative agency." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1981) (as revised).
As noted above, the revised provision is essentially a reiteration of the provisions of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, with the omission of one sentence which deals with the abolition
of a rule of equity practice which provided that "the averments of an answer under
oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained
by corroborating circumstances". See FED. R. Crv.. P. 11.
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The Administrator's motion sought the imposition of sanctions
against Mr. Smith and his attorneys based upon what the Administrator characterized as the filing of a "false, fraudulent and frivolous"

petition for reinstatement. The Administrator asserted that sanctions
were appropriate: (a) against Smith because he "knowingly, inten-

tionally and willfully" caused to be filed a petition which, in the
Administrator's words, was "riddled with fraud and falsehood"; and

(b) against Smith's attorneys because they had violated the dictates
of Rule 2-611 by signing and causing to be filed a petition for
reinstatement which was "riddled with fraud and falsehood" when
"reasonable inquiry" on their part would have revealed the factual
imperfections inherent therein.
In responding to the Administrator's motion, both Smith and
his former attorneys argued that Rule 2-611 did not apply to attorney
disciplinary and/or reinstatement proceedings. 1" They based their ar11. In addition to the argument adduced above, Smith and the attorneys also
argued that the Administrator's motion could not be granted for yet another reason:
Pointing out that Smith had moved to withdraw the offending petition and that the
Administrator had acquiesced therein, the defending parties argued that the matter
was in a posture equivalent to that which prevails when the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit
has moved to dismiss his complaint and/or when a prosecutor has filed a motion for
the voluntary dismissal of an indictment. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 21009; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Cook County, 279 Ill. App. 462, 466 (1935);
I11.Rev. Code Ch. 14 § 5; Creek v. Clark, 91 111. App. 3d 429, 414 N.E.2d 816, 821,
46 I11.Dec. 763, 768 (1980); People v. Verstat, 112 Ill. App. 3d 90, 444 N.E.2d 1374,
1385, 67 Ill. Dec. 691, 702 (1983). Citing the Seventh Circuit, they asserted that
"once there is no more dispute, there is no case." Alliance to End Repression
v.
City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1987).
The revised Rule 2-611 explicitly provides that "[a]ll proceedings under this
Section shall be within, and part of the civil action in which the pleading . . . has
been filed." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611. Therefore, Smith and his
erstwhile representatives argued, the Administrator's motion for sanctions under Rule
2-611 was "within and a part of" a proceeding in which there had been a de facto,
stipulated dismissal. The de facto dismissal, they asserted, effectively terminated the
underlying proceeding and all matters attendant thereupon, including the motion for
sanctions. They concluded by suggesting that principles of judicial economy militated
against proceeding to consider the merits of that motion in the absence of an actual
"case or controversy." See, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297
(1979);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Silver
Mfg. Co. v. General Box Co., 76 I11. 2d 413, 417-18, 392 N.E.2d 1343 (1979), quoting
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967); People v. Fife, 76 Ill. 2d 418, 392 N.E.2d
1343, 1345 (1979). As further support for their position, the Smith respondents
pointed out that at least one reported decision, In re Jerome Jacob Ruther, Supreme
Court M.R. 1431 (1981), involved an attorney who was permitted to withdraw his
petition for reinstatement while it was pending before the Supreme Court, which was
after the ARDC Hearing Board had recommended that the petition be denied.
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gument upon two propositions: (1) Rule 2-611 could not apply because
attorney admission and disciplinary proceedings are "original proceedings" before the Illinois Supreme Court which are not subject to
the provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure unless and to
the extent that the Court has explicitly ordered that they so apply;
and (2) attorney admission and disciplinary proceedings are sui generis
proceedings, being neither civil nor criminal in nature, and, as such,
cannot be encompassed by the provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure. Both propositions are considered below.
A.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS

Rule 2-611 is a provision of the llinois Code of Civil Procedure. 2
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 1-108 (hereinafter Rule 1-108) prescribes
the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3
The purpose of Rule 1-108(b) is to encompass idiosyncratic proceed-

ings such as chancery practice, dissolution actions, mechanic's lien
suits and election contests within the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 41
12. The provision appears in Article II of the Code of Civil Procedure
Illinois. See P.A. 82-280 (effective July 1, 1982). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para.
101(a) provides that "[t]his Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Code
Civil Procedure."' ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-101(b) provides that "Article
[of the Act] shall be known as the 'Civil Practice Law' and may be referred to
that designation."
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-108(b). Rule 1-108(b) provides that:
(a) The provisions of Article II of this Act apply to all proceedings covered
by Articles III through XIX of this Act except as otherwise provided in
each of the Articles III through XIX, respectively.
(b) In proceedings in which the procedure is regulated by statutes other than
those contained in this Act, such other statutes control to the extent to
which they regulate procedure but Article II of this Act applies to matters
of procedure not regulated by such other statutes.
(c) As to all matters not regulated by statute or rule of court, the practice
at common law prevails.

of
1of
II
by

Id.

14. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-108, "Historical and Practice Notes";
Malkov Lumber Co. v. Serafine Builders, Inc., 1 111. App. 3d 543, 273 N.E.2d 654
(1971). In Malkov, the court held that the Mechanic's Lien Act did not provide a
rule for a procedural problem. The court resolved the problem by looking to the
rules of practice and procedure of the Civil Practice Act. Id. at 550-51, 273 N.E.2d
at 659. See also, Harbeck v. Lyon, 329 111. App. 642, 70 N.E.2d 208 (1946), where
the court held that where special statutes are silent, provisions of the Civil Practice
Act are applicable.
In Annexation of Territory in County of Kankakee, 30 11.

App. 2d 391, 174

N.E.2d 710 (1961), the court held that where, in matters of procedure not covered
by [the Revised Cities and Villages Act], the Civil Practice Act would apply.
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This provision is simply intended to ensure that residual procedural
issues which are not explicitly addressed in the statutes governing such
proceedings can be resolved by reference to the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure. 5
It is Rule 1-108(a) which governs the general application of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 1-108(a), the Code
applies to "all proceedings covered by Articles III through XIX of
the [Civil Practice] Act except as otherwise provided in each of the
Articles III through XIX, respectively.' ' 6 Since attorney admission
and disciplinary matters are not included within Articles III through
XIX,'1 Smith and his attorneys concluded that Rule 2-611 could not
apply to the act of filing Smith's petition for reinstatement with the
Illinois Supreme Court.
In addition to parsing the language of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, Smith and his former attorneys derived this conclusion by
yet another means, i.e., an analysis of the nature of a proceeding for
reinstatement. This analysis began with the proposition that proceedings for reinstatement are established and governed by the provisions
of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 767.18
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 767, in turn, is predicated upon the
Court's inherent power to admit and discipline attorneys and to govern
the practice of law in this state. 19 Because they are predicated upon
15. See supra note 13.
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-108(a).
17. See id. The articles and their subject-matter are as follows: Article III "Administrative Review"; Article IV - "Attachment"; Article V - "Costs"; Article
VI - "Ejectment"; Article VII - "Eminent Domain"; Article VIII - "Evidence";

Article IX - "Forcible Entry and Detainer"; Article X - "Habeas Corpus"; Article
XI - "Injunction"; Article XII - "Judgments-Enforcement"; Article XIII - "Limi-

tations"; Article XIV - "Mandamus"; Article XV - "Mortgage Foreclosure"; Article
XVI - "Ne Exeat"; Article XVII - "Partition"; Article XVIII - "Quo Warranto";
Article XIX - "Replevin."

18. See supra notes 2-3.
19. See, e.g., In re Day, 181 111. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899). In Day, which involved
"an application to [the Supreme Court] for admission to the bar of this State by
virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants", the court held that
"the admission of attorneys [is] a judicial proceeding and the exercise of an
appropriate judicial function." Id. at 91-93, 54 N.E. at 651-52.
That power belongs to the court by virtue of its being a court of justice and
one of the departments of State into which, under the constitution, the
power falls. Without such power, by which the courts can protect themselves
against ignorance and want of skill, they cannot properly administer justice.
Id. at 94, 54 N.E. at 652. See also In re Nesselson, 76 Ill. 2d 135, 137-38, 390 N.E.2d
857, 858 (1979) (Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to regulate the practice
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this inherent power, attorney disciplinary proceedings are "original
proceedings" before the Illinois Supreme Court; 20 since reinstatement
proceedings are also predicated upon this inherent power, they, too,
represent "original proceedings" before the Court. 2 1
. Since reinstatement proceedings are "original proceedings" before the Illinois Supreme Court, they are necessarily governed by the
procedures applicable to such a proceeding. Therefore, because the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to such a proceeding, 22
it must be governed either by "rule of court . . . [or] the practice at
common law." ' 23 Three rules governing "Original Actions in the
Supreme Court" appear in the Supreme Court Rules. 24
The first of these, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 381, governs
"[p]roceedings in the Supreme Court in original actions in cases
relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition, or habeas corpus and as
may be necessary to the complete determination of any case on
of law in Illinois); Remole Soil Serv., Inc. v. Benson, 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 215 N.E.2d
678 (1966). In Benson, the court stated that "the license to practice law is a privilege
granted only by the Supreme Court and can only be delimited, restricted or taken
away by that Court or statutory enactments" 68 Ill. App. 2d at 236-37, 215 N.E. 2d
at 680.
20. See, e.g., In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 387 N.E.2d 278 cert. denied, 444
U.S. 916 (1979); In re Reynolds, 32 Ill. 2d 331, 205 N.E.2d 429 (1965).
21. For the proposition that an attorney reinstatement proceeding is a new and
independent proceeding, based upon the general jurisdiction of the judiciary to
control membership of the bar, see Cantor v. Grievance Committees, 189 Tenn. 536,
226 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1949); In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516 (1941).
See also 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 126 (1980). See generally In re Stephenson,

243 Ala. 342, 10 So. 2d 1 (1942); In re Fleming, 36 N.M. 93, 8 P.2d 1063 (1932);
Danford v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 303, 193 P. 272 (1920); In re Cate, 94 Cal.
App. 222, 270 P. 968 (1928), reh'g denied, 271 P. 356, supp. op., 95 Cal. App. 589,
273 P. 131, superseded, 207 Cal. 443, 279 P. 131 (1929). The fact that attorney
reinstatement proceedings are proceedings of the. same type as attorney disciplinary
proceedings is inferentially supported by the fact that both are assigned "a 'Miscellaneous Record' number (MR number) by the Clerk of the Court." BASSITT, supra
note 3, at 2-17; see also supra note 3.
22. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
23. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-108(c). The citation to this provision is,
of course, merely illustrative and is not intended to suggest that the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure governs attorney admission and disciplinary proceedings, even in this
limited, residual respect. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text, for the
proposition that legislative control of such proceedings would violate fundamental
principles of the "separation of powers."
24. See Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Article III (Civil Appeals Rules), Part
G, Rules 381-383. Supreme Court Rule 1, which prescribes the applicability of the
Supreme Court Rules, simply provides that "[tihe rules on appeals shall govern all
appeals."
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review." ' 25 The second, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 382, governs
"[p]roceedings in the Supreme Court when the court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction under article IV, section 3, and article V, section
6(d), of the [Illinois] Constitution. ' 26 The third and final rule is
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 383, which governs "motion[s] requesting
'27
the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority.
Reinstatement proceedings are not, therefore, within the express
compass of the rules which have been promulgated to govern "original
proceedings" before the Supreme Court. Reinstatement proceedings
are, however, proceedings "in the Supreme Court when the court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction". 2 Therefore, in the absence of
specific provision to the contrary, such proceedings are governed by
the procedure prescribed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 382 or by
29
analogy thereto.
Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 382(a), an original proceeding
is instituted by filing a motion for leave to file a complaint, with the
complaint and a brief in support thereof attached to the motion.30
"Thereafter, the case shall proceed in the manner ordered by the
court. Whenever appropriate, and subject to order of the court, the
25. Supreme Court Rule 381(a). The Supreme Court may exercise original
jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus
and as may be necessary to the complete determination of any case on review.
26. Supreme Court Rule 382. The Illinois Constitution of 1970, article IV, § 3
governs legislative redistricting, while Article V, § 6(d) governs "the ability of the
Governor to serve or to resume office."
27. See generally Supreme Court Rule 383.
28. Supreme Court Rule 382(a). For the proposition that attorney disciplinary
proceedings are original proceedings in the Supreme Court, see In re Reynolds, 32
Ill.2d 331, 205 N.E.2d 429 (1965). For the proposition that the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over "who may and may not be permitted to practice law in
this state", see Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan and Tyson, Inc., 53 111. App. 2d 388,
393, 203 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1st Dist. 1964); In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
See also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
29. This assumption is based upon two propositions in addition to those which
have been adduced above: (1) the procedure prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 382
is the most "generic" of the procedures established by the three Supreme Court rules
governing "original proceedings" and is, therefore, the most appropriate source of
analogy for a proceeding which is not explicitly encompassed within the provisions
of those rules; and (2) rather than ignoring the Supreme Court Rules and looking to
common law practice to define the procedures for hearing and adjudicating the merits
of reinstatement petitions, the preferred practice would seem to be to honor the
Supreme Court's existing pronouncements as to its own procedures by developing an
analogy which permits their extension to reinstatement proceedings.
30. The rule also provides that "(tlhe complaint may be supported by affidavits
or other pertinent documents." Supreme Court Rule 382(a).
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rules governing cases in the circuit court shall serve as a guide to the

procedure to be followed."'"

The application of this principle to original proceedings other

than those arising under Article IV, §3 and/or under Article V, §6(d)
is supported by the practice of the United States Supreme Court. Rule
9.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States governs
"actions within the Court's original jurisdiction under Article
III of

the Constitution of the United States", and provides, in pertinent
part, as follows: "The form of pleadings and motions in original
actions shall be governed, so far as may be, by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and in other respects those Rules, where their application is appropriate, may be taken as a guide to procedure in original

actions in this Court. ' 3 2

As one treatise has noted, "[iut would be natural that the Court

which promulgated the Civil Rules for the district courts would make
use of their principles for the trial of actions within the Court's
original jurisdiction. Yet in light of the Court's differentiating char-

acteristics as the supreme, trial/appellate court of this Nation, the
Court could go no further than to make the Civil Rules generally
applicable." 3 3 Given the "differentiating characteristics" of the Illi-

nois Supreme Court as "the supreme, trial/appellate court of this
[State]", similar constraints apply to that court's application of the
34
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.

31. Supreme Court Rule 382(b).

32. U.S. SuP. CT. R. 9.1, 28 U.S.C. Rule 9.1 (1984).
33. 13 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE, MooRE's

FEDERAL PRACTICE para.
809.21[l] (2d ed. 1985). See also id. at para. 809.31 (noting specific departures from
practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
34. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The discussion which follows is
predicated upon the assumption that the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 382(b) reference
to "the rules governing cases in the circuit court" should be construed as referring
(a) to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, or (b) to the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure plus the Supreme Court's own "Rules on Civil Proceedings in the Trial
Court" rather than as referring only to the Court's "Rules on Civil Proceedings in
the Trial Court". (For the provisions of the Supreme Court's "Rules on Civil
Proceedings in the Trial Court", see Supreme Court Rules 101-298.) The discussion
is predicated upon this assumption because only if the phrase is construed as referring
either to alternative (a) or (b) can there be any argument that Rule 2-611 could apply
to original actions such as proceedings for reinstatement as an attorney. That is, if
the above-quoted reference is construed as referring only to the Supreme Court's
own "Rules on Civil Proceedings in the Trial Court", then there can be no argument
in favor of the application of Rule 2-611 to original actions in which the procedure
must be defined by analogy to Supreme Court Rule 382. Since this construction
absolutely refutes the position which the ARDC has taken in the Smith hypothetical,
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And, indeed, although the rules are very similar in their provisions, there is one crucial distinction which leads one to conclude that
the Illinois rule is more restrictive in this respect than is its federal
counterpart. Whereas the United States Supreme Court rule provides
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "may be taken as a guide"
to procedure in original actions "where their application is appropriate", the Illinois Supreme Court rule adds an additional caveat:
Under Supreme Court Rule 382, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
serves as a guide to procedure in original actions only (a) "[w]henever
'3
appropriate", and (b) "subject to order of the court."
Since Illinois Supreme Court Rule 382 is "based in part upon
• . . Rule 9 of the United States Supreme Court Rules", 3 6 one must
assume that the addition of (b), above, was intended as an express
limitation upon the general applicability of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure to original actions in the Illinois Supreme Court. This
construction of the phrase is supported by a crucial distinction between
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States,37 the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was promulgated and adopted by the
Illinois legislature.

8

Since the power to prescribe rules of judicial procedure is inti-

mately bound up with the doctrine of "separation of powers",

39

it is

it has been reserved for this note; the primary analysis which appears in the text is
concerned with refuting the only assumption that can support the ARDC's position.
35. Supreme Court Rule 382(b).
36. Supreme Court Rule 382, "Committee Comments" (Smith-Hurd July 1,
1971).
37. See, e.g., Orders Re Rules of Procedure, 302 U.S. 783 (1937) ("It is ordered
that Rules of Procedure for the District Courts of the United States be adopted
pursuant to Section 2 of the Act of June 19, 1934, Chapter 651 (48 Stat. 1064)");
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, ch.
651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064).
38. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, para. 1-101 (1985); see also Public Act
82-280 (effective July 1, 1982).
39.
The [Illinois] Constitution of 1970 vests the judicial power in the supreme
court, an appellate court and circuit courts, and it declares that no branch
of government 'shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.'
Bonaguro, The Supreme Court's Exclusive Rulemaking Authority, 67 ILL. BAR J.

408 (March, 1979), quoting ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 1 and article II, § 1. The
Illinois Supreme Court has relied upon the separation of power doctrine in striking
down legislative enactments which it perceived as "infring[ing] upon the powers of
the judiciary." See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 255-61, 371 N.E.2d 602,
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only reasonable to assume that Rule 382, and practice based upon
analogy thereto, must reflect the Illinois Supreme Court's ability to
retain control over proceedings which are encompassed by its "original
and exclusive jurisdiction." 4 Any assumption to the contrary would
effectively eliminate the "separation of powers" contained in the
Constitution of the State of Illinois in that it would permit the
legislature to usurp a traditional, inherent prerogative of the Illinois
41
Supreme Court and lower state courts.
The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that the procedure in
original actions which do not fall within the express compass of
Supreme Court Rules 381-383 is as follows: After the proceeding has
been initiated by the filing of a petition for reinstatement or other
appropriate pleading, it will proceed "in the manner ordered by the
604-06 (1977); People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62, 65-66, 237 N.E.2d 495,
497 (1968); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Il1. 145, 148-50, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715
(1952). The "concurrent power relationship between the legislature and the judiciary"
with respect to the authority to promulgate rules of judicial procedure is a subject
which is beyond this scope of this article. See, e.g, Note, People ex rel. Stamos v.

Jones: A Restraint on Legislative Revision of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, 6 J.
MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 382 (1973); Fins, Impropriety of Illinois Legislature's
Infringement upon the ConstitutionalRule-Making Authority of the Supreme Court,
66 ILL. BAR J. 384 (March, 1978); Note, Exclusive Judicial Power to Regulate
Appellate Practice and Procedure-Peoplev. Cox, 30 DE PAuL L. REv. 969 (1981).

With respect to the point at issue herein, it appears that the proper resolution of this
"concurrent power relationship" is according to the following principle:
[Wihere there has been ...

a conflict between [a] legislative enactment and

a Supreme Court Rule in [an] area[] where the legislative power is not
constitutionally established or where the Court believes that it has an inherent
judicial power, the Supreme Court has held that the rule takes precedence
over the statute.
REc. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., vol. VI at 825 (1969-70). Since In re Day,
181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899), established that the admission of attorneys is a matter
encompassed by the Court's "inherent judicial power", and since reinstatement
proceedings are proceedings for the admission of attorneys, it necessarily follows that
the Supreme Court's rule-making authority takes precedence over any legislative
enactments with respect to the procedure which is to be followed in such proceedings.
And, since the Supreme Court's rule-making authority takes precedence in this area,
it necessarily follows that Rule 2-611 cannot apply to such proceedings absent an
explicit exercise of the Court's rule-making authority to that effect.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 235, 179 N.E.2d 898, 903-04 (1931)
("the legislature ...

shall not encroach upon the inherent powers of the judiciary");

People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980); People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d
252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d
713 (1952); Feldcott v. Featherstone, 290 Il1. 485, 125 N.E. 361 (1919); Wallbaum v.
Haskin, 49 Il. 313 (1868).
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court". In entering such orders, the supreme court will use the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure "as a guide" "[w]henever [such procedure
is deemed to be] appropriate." Such procedure will not be deemed to
be appropriate unless the court shall have entered an order to this
effect.
Therefore, Smith and his attorneys argued Rule 2-611 as amended
by Public Act 84-1431 could not apply to the filing of the Smith
petition since no order to this effect had been entered prior to the
filing of that motion. Smith and the attorneys also argued that the
Illinois Supreme Court could not enter an order retroactively applying
the provisions of Rule 2-611, as amended by Public Act 84-1431, to
the filing of the Smith petition for the reasons (a) that doing so would
controvert basic principles of due process, 42 and (b) that no support
43
for such an order could be found in common law practice.
B. SUI GENERIS PROCEEDINGS

"Disbarment and suspension proceedings are neither civil nor
criminal in nature but are special proceedings, sui generis, and result
42. The argument was that a retrospective application of the amended rule
would deny due process in that Smith and/or his attorneys could be sanctioned for
violating the dictates of Rule 2-611 without ever having been provided notice of its
applicability and the opportunity to comply with its requirements. For the proposition
that court rules cannot be retroactively applied when to do so would work an
injustice, see 35A C.J.S. FederalCivil Procedure § 20 (1960); 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal
Practice and Procedure § 519, § 520 (1982); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. First
Nat'l. Bank, 103 F.2d 977, 979 (3d Cir. 1939); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Barnett, 118 F.2d 190, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 641, reh'g
denied, 314 U.S. 709 (1941); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 27 F.
Supp. 198, 206 (D. Del. 1939), aff'd, I10 F.2d 15, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940).
43. Although "[tihe .

.

. rule requiring that counsel sign pleadings dates back

to English equity practice at the time of Sir Thomas More", that rule appears to
have been primarily concerned with "assur[ing] that pleadings complied with the
correct forms and ...

grant[ing] counsel a monopoly over cases brought before

chancery courts." SOLOVY,

WEDOFF &

BART-HowE,

SANCTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE

CrvIL PROCEDURE 11, reprintedin J. Solovy & C. Shaffer, Jr., Rule 11 and Other
Sanctions at 9, 15 (PLI 1987); see also Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its
Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
OF

61 MINN.
procedure
there was
imposition

L. REV. 1, 8-14 (1976). And although nineteenth century federal equity
"required every bill to contain counsel's signature as an 'affirmation' that
'good cause' for the suit", this requirement did not contemplate the
of sanctions within the meaning of the present federal rule. See supra

SOLOVY, WEDOFF &

BART-HOWE, at 16.

"At common law, a successful litigant was not entitled to recover from his
losing adversary the costs and expenses of the litigation; hence, the allowance and
recovery of costs rests entirely on statutory provisions .... " ILL. LAW & PRACTICE
Costs § 2 (1968).
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from the inherent power of courts over their officers."" As such,

"[a] disbarment action or proceeding to suspend an attorney at law
'45
does not come within the Civil Practice Act."

Because actions for reinstatement as an attorney at law also
derive "from the inherent power of courts over their officers", 46 they,
too, are "neither civil nor criminal in nature but are special proceedings, sui generis ' 47 and do "not come within the Civil Practice Act."
Because reinstatement proceedings do "not come within the Civil

Practice Act", Rule 2-611 cannot apply to such proceedings.
' 48
Rule 2-611 is contained within the present "Civil Practice Law."
As such, it applies only to civil proceedings. This conclusion is

44. In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970), citing Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265 (1882). Accord, In re Czachorski, 41 111. 2d 549, 554, 244 N.E.2d 164, 167
(1969); In re Damisch, 38 I11.
2d 195, 206, 230 N.E.2d 254, 260 (1967); In re
Yablunsky, 407 Ill. 111, 120, 94 N.E.2d 841, 846 (1950). See ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:2101-2103 (1984) ("disciplinary proceedings
are sui generis . . . distinct from [either] civil or criminal proceedings") citing to
ABA, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, Standard
1.2 (1979). See also Swett, Illinois Attorney Discipline, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 325, 331
(1977) ("disciplinary proceedings ... are considered to be judicial in character, yet
are neither criminal nor civil in nature") (footnotes omitted); Murphy, A Short
History of DisciplinaryProcedures in Illinois, 60 ILL. BAR J. 528, 532 (1972). See
generally 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 87 (1980).
43, 49, 15 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1938).
45. Weyland v. City of Chicago, 369 I11.
See also Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1951).
46. See supra notes 44-45.
47. See generally, 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client §§ 122-124 (1980); 7 AM. JUR.
2D Attorneys at Law § 87 (1980); Annotation, Reinstatement of Attorney, 70
A.L.R.2d 314 (1960). See also supra note 44.
The sui generis character of reinstatement proceedings is derivable not only from
the fact that such proceedings are predicated upon "the inherent power of courts
over their officers", but also from the distinctive burden of proof involved therein:
"When a disbarred attorney petitions for reinstatement the burden is on the petitioner
to prove his or her qualification for reinstatement by clear and convincing evidence."
In re Carnow, 114 Ill. 2d 461, 501 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1986). Accord, In re Rothenberg,
108 I11.
2d 313, 484 N.E.2d 289 (1985); In re Mandell, 89 I11.
2d 14, 431 N;E.2d 382
(1982); In re Kuta, 86 11.
2d 154, 427 N.E.2d 136 (1981). Since the standard of proof
in a civil case is the "preponderance of the evidence standard", and since criminal
proceedings require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt", the use of the "clear and
convincing" standard is itself sufficient to establish that proceedings for reinstatement
are of a distinct and peculiar nature. See Scholle v. Continental Nat. Am. Group, 44
Ill. App. 3d 716, 358 N.E.2d 893 (1976) (civil standard); Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid
Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207 (1927) (same); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-1 (1983)
(criminal standard).
48. Weyland's reference to the "Civil Practice Act" was a reference to the
precursor of the present "Civil Practice Law", which is codified as Article II of the
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derivable, first of all, from the plain language of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure which includes Rule 2-611 and which was considered
above. 49 The conclusion is also derivable from an analysis of the
provisions of the federal rule upon which Rule 2-611 was modeled.
As was noted above, Rule 2-611 is an almost-verbatim reiteration
of the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11.50 Although
Rule 2-611 includes language which does not appear in the federal
rule, and although Rule 2-611 deletes one sentence which does appear
in the federal rule, the provisions of Rule 2-611 Which were invoked
by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission [hereinafter ARDC] motion for sanctions against Smith and his attorneys are
identical to those contained within Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11.51
The federal rule must, therefore, provide the model for interpreting and applying Rule 2-611, at least with respect to motions such
as that filed by the Administrator of the ARDC. An analysis of the
federal rule, however, requires the conclusion that the Administrator's
motion cannot be granted for the reason that neither Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 11 nor Rule 2-611 applies to attorney admission and
52
disciplinary proceedings.
Rule 11, which was amended in 1983 to permit the imposition of
sanctions for "pleading and motion abuses", 53 is included within the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the "scope" of which is defined by
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-101(a), (b).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611, of course, is included within Article II of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. See supra note 10.
49. See supra Section II(A). Although ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-108
does not expressly limit the application of Article II of the Code of Civil Procedure
to civil proceedings, it achieves this outcome by expressly delineating the proceedings
to which the code does apply. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
51. See id.
52. Implicit in this and similar statements which appear in the text above is the
proposition that ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 does not apply to attorney
admission and disciplinary proceedings absent an explicit order entered by the Illinois
Supreme Court to this effect. The argument adduced above is in no way intended to
suggest that the Illinois Supreme Court cannot require that pleadings in such
proceedings conform to the dictates of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 or some
other, similar provision; the authority to enter such an order is, of course, implicit
in the Court's "inherent authority" over such proceedings.
53. In 1983, the existing Rule 11 was amended to allow for the imposition of
"appropriate sanction[s]" for such abuses. See Advisory Committee Note, 1983
Amendment to FED. R. Cirv. P. 11. For a discussion of the provisions and application
of the amended rule, see Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal Rule I1-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 204 (1985).
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Rule 1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 provides that "[these
rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all
suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity
or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.'"'4 At least one
decision has held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to disbarment proceedings, since the "Rules . . . govern only
suits of a civil nature" and disbarment proceedings are not "suits of
a civil nature."

55

Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to
disbarment proceedings, Rule 11 of those rules does not apply to such
proceedings and, by logical extension based upon the principles discussed above, 56 does not apply to proceedings for reinstatement after
disbarment. Since Rule 2-611 is based upon Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 11, it follows that Rule 2-611 does not apply to proceedings
for reinstatement after disbarment. Therefore, Smith and his former
attorneys argued, the Administrator's motion for sanctions pursuant
to Rule 2-611 could not be granted."
54. FED. R. CIrv. P. 81 provides, for example, that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not "apply to prize proceedings in admiralty governed by Title 10,
U.S.C. §§ 7651-7681", to proceedings in bankruptcy or in copyright, or to "mental
health proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia."
See FED. R. CIv. P. 8 1(a).
55. Coughlan v. United States, 236 F.2d 927, 928 (9th Cir. 1956); see also
Alaska Bar Association v. Dickerson, 240 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (D. Alaska 1965)
(disciplinary proceeding before a state bar association was not a "civil action" within
the meaning of the federal removal statute). For the proposition that "the new Rule
11 does not refer to disciplinary action against an attorney", see SoLovy, WEDOFF &
BART-HOWE, SANCTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, reprinted in
J. SoLovY & C. SHAFFER, RULE 11 AND OTHER SANCTIONS at 9, 50 (PLI 1987).
56. See supra notes 44-47.
57. They also argued that even if the court were to hold that Rule 2-611 did
apply to such proceedings, the requests contained in the Administrator's motion
could not be granted as presented for the following reason: Smith and his attorneys
argued that sanctions under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611, if they applied,
could only be applied as an alternative to the contempt sanction which was also
requested in the Administrator's motion. The Smith respondents contended that
sanctions under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 are imposed for the filing of
pleadings which contain frivolous or unwarranted assertions due to the attorney's
failure to make a "reasonable inquiry" into the factual foundation for such assertions.
Rule 11 expressly imposes an affirmative duty to investigate the facts and law that
support a pleading, motion or other paper. See SOLOVY-SHAFFER, supra note 43, at
22. A failure to conduct a reasonable investigation violates Rule 11, regardless of the
merit of the pleading or motion. Id. at 23.
Smith and the attorneys then argued that "reasonableness" is the identifying
characteristic of a negligence inquiry, concluding that sanctions Under FED. R. Civ.
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It is also possible to support this argument by means of an
alternative analysis, an analysis which is predicated upon a proposition
with which the authors disagree, i.e., that proceedings for disbarment
from and reinstatement to the Illinois bar can properly be characterized either as a variety of appellate proceeding or as the functional
equivalent thereof. The proposition is predicated upon the essentially

intuitive assumption that, because such proceedings are before the
Illinois Supreme Court, which generally entertains only appellate
proceedings, they are, therefore, themselves a form of "appellate
proceeding.""5

P. II and, by derivation, under Rule 2-611, are imposed for the negligent submission
of frivolous or unfounded assertions and/or pleadings. "Negligence is the omission
to do something which a reasonable man would do, or doing something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 53
(3d ed. 1964).
Smith and the attorneys then argued that contempt sanctions are imposed for
conduct which involves a higher standard of reprehensibility than that which is
associated with mere negligence. In support of their arguments, Smith and the
attorneys pointed out that certain types of contempt are considered "crimes," so
that proceedings for their adjudication and punishment must conform to the traditional guarantees of due process whiih are attendant upon the criminal sanctioning
process. See, e.g., infra Sections III(A), (B). Since contempt can constitute a criminal
offense, particularly when it involves the perpetration of a fraud upon the court, the
Smith parties argued that it would be impermissible to impose sanctions for "negligence" under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 and for criminal contempt, since
logic dictated that the act of filing a false pleading must either be the consequence
of negligence or of wilfulness sufficient to warrant the imposition of criminal
sanctions. Negligence differs from intentional acts. While negligence can include the
mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk, intent exists when the actor believes that
certain consequences are substantially certain to result from his actions. PROSSER,
supra, at 31-32.

To sustain a conviction for indirect criminal contempt, the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an alleged contemnor had the intent to embarrass,
hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, to lessen its authority
or dignity or bring the administration of law into disrepute; only conduct which is
performed willfully can constitute indirect criminal contempt. See, e.g., People v.
Douglas, 73 111. App. 3d 520, 392 N.E.2d 75 (1979); People v. Witherspoon, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 151, 367 N.E.2d 313 (1971).
58. The authors' disagreement with this assumption is predicated upon their
agreement with the proposition that reinstatement and/or disciplinary proceedings
are "original proceedings" which are sui generis in character. See supra Sections
II(A), (B). If reinstatement and/or disciplinary proceedings are "original proceedings" of a sui generis nature, they cannot, by definition, constitute "appellate
proceedings" within the meaning of the assumption adduced above. That is, "appellate proceedings" is a phrase which must be construed as denoting the efforts involved
in seeking review of a lower court's decision, whether in a civil or criminal matter,
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The acceptance of this proposition gives rise to the following
premise: In order to determine whether Rule 2-611 applies to disbarment and/or reinstatement proceedings, it is necessary to determine
whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 applies to federal appellate proceedings; the premise is predicated upon the proposition that
since Rule 2-611 is modeled after the federal provision, it must emulate
the federal provision's applicability, or inapplicability, to such proceedings. Therefore, in this scenario, if Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 applies to "appellate proceedings," then Illinois Rule 2-611
must also apply to "appellate proceedings." By virtue of the assumption described above, Rule 2-611 must also apply to disbarment and/
or reinstatement proceedings, having been characterized as but a
variety of Illinois appellate proceedings.
Unfortunately, however, even if one accepts the proposition that
such proceedings can be characterized as "appellate proceedings,"
one is still led to the conclusion that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
11 does not apply to appellate proceedings; one must also conclude
that Rule 2-611 cannot apply to proceedings for disbarment and/or
reinstatement. These conclusions are derivable from the following
considerations: federal appeals, both civil and criminal, are governed
by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 9 Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure 38 provides that "[i]f a court of appeals shall
determine an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and
single or double costs to the appellee."
Under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38, costs and "double costs" have been assessed against appellants and against "appellant's counsel personally. "6 The rule "is designed to penalize appellants

by some appellate tribunal. See, e.g., Supreme Court Rules 301-374 (civil appeals),
Rules 601-651 (criminal appeals); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 89-90 (5th ed. 1979). No
such efforts are, however, involved in reinstatement and/or disciplinary proceedings,
since they concern the Supreme Court's exercising its "inherent power" over the
practice of law in Illinois, rather than the review of a decision entered by a lower
court.
59. See FED. R. App. P. 1(a) ("scope of rules"). See also FED. R. App. P. 4
(appeals in civil and criminal cases).
60. 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE para.
238.02 (2d ed. 1987); see, e.g., Stelly v. CIR, 761 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.), cert.denied,
106 S. Ct. 149 (1985); Haggerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 333 (1985); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651

F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981);.Malhiot v. Southern California Retail Clerks Union, 735

F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 959 (1985); United States
v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1144

(1983). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1912 ("Where a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

who bring frivolous appeals and to compensate appellees who must
answer frivolous appeals." 6' Since Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 191262 permit sanctions to be imposed for
frivolous appeals Which are submitted to the federal appellate and
United States Supreme Court, one must conclude, as has the Seventh
63
Circuit, that Rule 11 does not apply to federal appellate proceedings.
To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the plain language of
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912.
Therefore, (a) since Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 does not
apply to federal appellate proceedings, and (b) since Illinois Rule 2611 is based upon Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, one must
conclude that Illinois Rule 2-611 does not apply to disbarment and/
or reinstatement proceedings even if the latter are conceptualized as
a variety of appellate proceedings.
Recently, in In re W. Jason Mitan, 64 the Supreme Court of
Illinois has addressed the issue as to the applicability of Rule 2-61 1
to Illinois Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings. In Mitan, the Administrator of the ARDC filed a motion for sanctions with the Supreme
Court of Illinois, averring that Mitan's petition for reinstatement was
manifestly fraudulent and frivolous. The administrator relied on Rule
2-611 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 5 and the inherent powers
of the court in requesting a rule to show cause why Mitan should not
be held in contempt of court for filing a fraudulent petition for
reinstatement.
The administrator's sole argument in support of this contention
was that the statute, in authorizing sanctions, does not limit its use
Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing
party just damages for his delay, and single or double costs.").
61. Dobbin & Lewis, Sanctions Available under Rules 16, 26, and 37, 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1912, 1927, and Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, reprinted
in J. SOLOVY & C. SHAFFER,

JR., RULE

11

AND OTHER

SANCTIONs at 453, 454 (1987).

See also Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974). 28 U.S.C. § 1912 contains similar provisions:
"Where a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the
court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay,
and single or double costs." Id.
62. See supra notes 60-61.
63. See, e.g., Hill v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1200
(7th Cir. 1987); see also Covington v. Allsbrook, 636 F.2d 63, 64 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914 (1981); cf. In re Kelly, 808 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1986);
In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1986); Thorton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151,
1153 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 181 (1987).
64. In re Jason Mitan, Supreme Court M.R. 4172, slip op. (Dec. 30, 1987).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Supp. 1986).
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of the word "court" to the lower cOurts of this State. The argument
followed that if the legislature did not intend for the Supreme Court
of Illinois to have the power to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 2611, then it could have and should have said so. Mitan's counsel
argued that Rule 2-611 did not apply to these proceedings.
The court addressed the issue of whether Rule 2-611 applied to
the filing of a verified petition for reinstatement as an attorney. The
court noted that no Illinois court of review had yet had the opportunity to interpret or apply the amended Rule 2-611. It also noted
that there was no federal case law involving Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 11 that would lead analogously to the resolution of the
question whether Rule 2-611 reaches to the filing of a verified petition
for reinstatement.
The Supreme Court of Illinois was not pursuaded by the Administrator's argument. It stated that the question at hand was not
whether the Supreme Court of Illinois could impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 2-611 in other appropriate cases, but rather the different
and narrow question whether the statute applies to the unique situation
where an allegedly false petition for reinstatement has been filed. The
court agreed that Rule 2-611 does not expressly preclude the Supreme
Court of Illinois from availing itself of its sanctioning power in
appropriate cases. However, the plain language of Rule 2-611 offers
no support for the proposition that the statute, without more, applies
to reinstatement proceedings. Rule 2-611 applies only in civil actions,
and reinstatement proceedings are not civil actions.
The court stated that the procedure for the hearing and review
of the petition is the same as that for attorney disciplinary cases. Like
disciplinary proceedings, proceedings for reinstatement are sui generis,
being neither civil nor criminal in nature. 6 The sui generis status of
reinstatement proceedings follows, not only from the fact that such
proceedings are based upon the inherent powers of courts over their
officers, but also from the special burden of proof a petitioner bears.
A petitioner must prove his or her qualifications for reinstatement by
clear and convincing evidence. The court concluded that Rule 2-611
neither authorizes nor prohibits the imposition of sanctions where an
allegedly false verified petition for reinstatement is filed pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 767.
The court continued that it could still impose sanctions based on
its inherent power to govern admission to the practice of law in
66. Mitan, Supreme Court M.R. at -,
citing In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347,
349 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Czachorski, 41 111. 2d. 549, 554 (1969).
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Illinois.61 It is the Supreme Court of Illinois which possesses the

inherent and exclusive power to regulate the practice of law in Illinois

and to sanction or discipline the unprofessional conduct of attorneys

admitted to practice before

it.68

III.

CONTEMPT

In addition to requesting that sanctions be imposed against Smith
and his attorneys pursuant to Rule 2-611, the Administrator's motion
also requested the issuance of a rule to show cause why Smith and
his attorneys should not be held in contempt of court for the filing
of a false and fraudulent pleading.6 9 After hearing oral argument on
the request for sanctions pursuant to Rule 2-611, the supreme court
denied that request and entered an order requiring Smith and the
attorneys to appear and to show cause why they should not be held
in contempt for the filing of a petition for reinstatement which
"appears to be false and fraudulent."
Because neither the Administrator's motion nor the supreme
court's order indicated whether the rule to show cause contemplated
a citation (a) for civil or criminal contempt, and (b) for direct or
indirect contempt, 70 Smith and the attorneys filed motions requesting
clarification of the court's order. 7' The court's response was to
67. In re Application of Day, 181 Il. 73 (1899).
68. In re Nesselson, 76 Ill. 2d 135, 137-38 (1979); In re Reynolds, 32 Il1. 2d
331, 336 (1965).
69. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
70. [T]here are four types of contempt, which are delineated as follows: (1)
indirect contempt which entails a contumacious act committed outside the
presence of the court ... ; (2) direct contempt which involves an act
committed in the presence of the court ... ; (3) civil contempt which consists
of failing to do something ordered by the court, usually for the benefit of
the opposing litigant ... ; and (4) criminal contempt which comprises
conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court or the judge
acting judicially. ...
Eden v. Eden, 34 I11. App. 3d 382, 388, 340 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1975) (citations
omitted).
71. The motions were based upon the following proposition:
[i]n proceedings to punish indirect criminal contempts, due process requires
that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing. The accused
contemnor has 'the constitutional right to know the nature of the charge
against him, to have it definitely and specifically set forth by citation or
rule to show cause, and to be accorded an opportunity to answer and to
introduce evidence in his own defense.
People v. Waldron, 114 I11. 2d 295, 302-03, 500 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1986) (citations
omitted), quoting People v. Pomeroy, 405 Il. 175, 181, 90 N.E.2d 102, 105 (1950);
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establish a briefing schedule on this issue, requiring all parties to

submit arguments as to the type of contempt at issue and the

appropriate sanctions therefor. Sections (A) and (B), below, discuss
the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, and direct and
indirect contempt, while section (C) presents the arguments adduced
by the respective parties.
A.

CIVIL VERSUS CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

Rules for preserving discipline, essential to the administration of justice, came into existence with the law itself, and

Contempt of Court (contemptus curiae) has been a recognized

phrase in English law from the twelfth century to the present

time ...

The punishment of contempt is the basis of all legal
procedure and implies two distinct functions to be exercised
by the Court: (a) enforcement of the process and orders of
the Court, disobedience to which may be described as 'civil
contempt', and (b) punishment of other acts which hinder the

administration of justice, such as disturbing the proceedings
of the Court while it is sitting (contempt in court) or libelling
a Judge or publishing comments on a pending case (contempt
out of court), which are both distinguished as 'criminal contempt.'
Civil . . . contempt is a wrong for which the law awards
reparation to the injured party; though nominally a contempt
of court, it is in fact a wrong of a private nature as between
subject and subject ....
Some contempts partake of both

natures .72

citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
275-76 (1948). See also People v. Spain, 307 I11.283, 292, 138 N.E. 614, 618 (1923)
("Where one is charged with criminal contempt, he is entitled to the same orderly
trial accorded any other defendant. He is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, and he cannot be compelled to give evidence
against himself.") See also infra Sections III(A),,(B).
72. J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1-2 (1927). See also Gompers.
v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). "In the Anglo-Saxon laws and
through Domesday Book, the records of the Curia Regis and the Parliament, the
first treatises on law and the Year Books, the development of 'contempt' in the legal
sense can be traced, until by the fourteenth century the principles upon which
punishment was inflicted . . . had become firmly entrenched." Fox, supra, at 1. See
generally IV W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: ON PUBLIC
WRONGS 125-26 (1966).
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Although the Illinois courts have held that contempt is divisible
into "civil" and "criminal" contempt,7 3 the courts have also held
that the same conduct can constitute both civil and criminal contempt.7 4 In People v. Barasch," the Illinois Supreme Court characterized the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt. Criminal
contempt is intended to preserve the dignity and authority of the
court, while civil contempt enforces private rights. The punishment
for each reflects this, as imprisonment for civil contempt is usually
coercive, i.e. not punishment for what has been done, as is the case
with criminal contempt.7 6 The appellate court offered its own description of the two concepts in People ex rel. Fahner v. Colorado Lot
Owners Assn.7 7 Because civil contempt is inherently coercive, the
contemnor must be allowed the opportunity to comply with the court

73. See, e.g., Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Kruse, 156 Il1. App. 3d 526, 509
N.E.2d 136 (2d Dist. 1987); People v. Romanski, 155 Ill. App. 3d 47, 507 N.E.2d
887 (3d Dist. 1987); People v. Barasch, 21 111. 2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417 (1961); People
v. Elbert, 287 11. 458, 122 N.E. 816 (1919); People v. Diedrich, 141 Ill. 665, 20 N.E.
1038 (1892).
74. See, e.g., People ex rel. Fahner v. Colorado Lot Owners Assn, 108 Ill.
App. 3d 266; 277, 438 N.E.2d 1273, 1280 (1982); People v- Barasch, 21 111. 2d 407,
173 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1961); People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 106 N.E.2d 333 (1952).
See also United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947)
("Common sense would recognize that conduct can amount to both civil and criminal
contempt. The same acts may justify a court in resorting to coercive and to punitive
measures.").
75. 21 111. 2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417 (1961).
76. 21 111. 2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1961).
77.
Proceedings in the nature of civil contempt ordinarily are prosecuted to
enforce the rights of private parties and to compel obedience to orders or
decrees for the benefit of opposing parties. Proceedings in the nature of
criminal contempt are directed to the preservation of the dignity and
authority of the court, or a judge acting judicially. A sanction for civil
contempt is coercive in nature and is instituted to compel obedience to a
court order. The contemnor can avoid the sanction by compliance with the
order. The sanction invoked, such as incarceration, will continue in effect
until there is compliance or termination of the sanction by the terms of the
order itself. A sanction for criminal contempt is punitive in nature and is
instituted to punish, as opposed to coerce, a contemnor for contumacious
conduct.
108 Ill. App. 3d 266, 277, 438 N.E.2d 1273, 1280 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See
also 47th & State Currency Exch., Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp., 56 Ill. App. 3d 229,
233, 371 N.E.2d 294, 297-98 (1977); In re Estate of Schlensky, 49 Ill. App. 3d 885,
891-92, 364 N.E.2d 430, 435 (1977); People v. Elbert, 287 Ill. 458, 122 N.E. 816
(1919).
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order, the disobedience of which gave rise to the contempt citation. 78
The distinction between coercion and punishment, between a
sanction imposed for a failure to act and a sanction imposed for an
affirmative "bad" act, occasions little confusion between the categories of civil and criminal contempt. Indeed, as the Barasch court
noted, 79 one generally need only look to the "purpose of punishment"
to determine whether civil or criminal contempt is at issue.80 Unfor78. The essence of a civil contempt is that when the trial court's command
is disobeyed, the loss of benefit or advantage falls upon the adversary and
the dignity of the court is only incidentally involved .... A civil contempt

decree must provide [a] defendant with the keys to his cell, enabling him
through compliance with the terms of the command to purge himself of
contempt.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Brach, 71 111. App. 3d 789, 792-93, 390 N.E.2d 373,
373-76 (1979). Accord In re Marriage of Harvey, 136 Ill. App. 3d 116, 483 N.E.2d
397 (1985); Welding Indus. Supply Co., Inc. v. Northtown Indus., Inc., 58 Ill. App.
3d 625, 374 N.E.2d 1002 (1978); Taapken v. Taapken, 39 Ill. App. 3d 785, 350
N.E.2d 794 (1976).
If imprisonment is imposed for civil contempt it must ordinarily be coercive
or remedial in nature rather than punitive. Imprisonment for civil contempt
usually is not for a definite term, but the party in contempt stands committed
unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the order of
the court. It is for this reason that in civil contempt it is stated that the
contemnor carries the key of his prison in his pocket.
People v. Mowery, 116 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702, 452 N.E.2d 363, 368 (1983), quoting
17 C.J.S. Contempt § 93, at 268-69 (1963). Imprisonment for criminal contempt is
for a definite term. See, e.g., People v. Harrison, 403 111. 320, 86 N.E.2d 208 (1949);
People v. Redlich, 402 Ill.
270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949). In addition, a contemnor
cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which exceeds a period of six months
without first having been accorded the right to a trial by jury. Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194, 210-11 (1968).
79. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
80. Although, as noted above, "the contemptuous act may partake of the
characteristics of both civil and criminal contempt" as when, for example, "the
violation of a single order . . . may give rise to both civil and criminal contempt

proceedings"' the nature of a particular proceeding is seldom in doubt, since one
need only determine the purpose which is to be achieved by the imposition of a
particular sanction. See 5 J. MooRE, J. LUCAS, & G. GROTHER, JR., MOORE'S

para. 38.33[l] (2d ed. 1985). Since the institution of both types
of proceedings will have been undertaken in order to achieve two disparate ends,
FEDERAL PRACTICE

i.e., coercing the party into complying with a particular order of the court and
punishing the same party for past disobedience of that order and/or for contumacious
conduct associated with the disobedience of that order, it is not, typically, difficult
to distinguish the procedural and substantive characteristics of the two proceedings.
See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 298-300
(1947). "In patent cases it has been usual to embrace in one proceeding the public
and private remedy-to punish the defendant if found worthy of punishment, and,
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tunately, however, the categories of direct and indirect contempt are
far less distinguishable.
B.

DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT CONTEMPT

In People v. Harrison,"'the supreme court noted the distinction
between direct and indirect contempt, the former occurring in the
physical presence of a judge or admitted in open court, while the
latter, having neither of those characteristics, must be proven by
extrinsic evidence.8 2 The distinction is perhaps best illustrated by
examining the underlying facts and eventual holding in People v.
Jashunsky,83 which involved both varieties of contempt. In Jashunsky
ten defendants were found to be in direct contempt of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment.8 4 The contempt citation was issued when, while court was in
session, one of the defendants began shouting, resisted removal from
the courtroom, and incited a melee.85

6
The defendants were charged and convicted of direct contempt.1

The record revealed that the trial court had personally observed the

contemptuous conduct of defendants Jashunsky and Caref, while it

at the same time, or as an alternative, to assess damages and costs for the benefit of
the plaintiff." Id. at 299 n.71, quoting Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 F. 810, 813
(C.C.D. Mass. 1884).
81. 403 Ill. 320, 86 N.E.2d 208 (1949).
82. Id. at 323-24, 86 N.E.2d at 210. See also Central Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Kruse, 156 Ill. App. 3d 526, 509 N.E.2d 136 (2d Dist. 1987); People v. Romanski,
155 Ill. App. 3d 47, 507 N.E.2d 887 (3d Dist. 1987); Siegel v. Siegel, 80 Ill. App. 3d
583, 400 N.E.2d 6 (1979); People v. Jashunsky, 51 111. 2d 220, 282 N.E.2d 1 (1972).
83. 51 Ill.
2d 220, 282 N.E.2d 1 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1973).
84. The defendants were Albert Jashunsky, Carol Caref, Jerome H. Harris,
Reynold E. Sodini, Arthur Hirsch, Randiee Ascher, Dennis Johnson, Jaroslaw Salek,
Kathleen A. Lindsley, and Marlow Lowentha. Id. at 221, 282 N.E.2d at 2. "Sentences
of four months were imposed on Jashunsky and Caref, and the other defendants
received sentences of 30 days." Id.
85. Id. at 221, 282 N.E.2d at 2-3.
The defendants were in the courtroom of Judge Meyer Goldstein on the
morning of August 12, 1970 .... When the court session opened, the court
admonished against any disorders in the courtroom. However, as [a] criminal
case was called, Caref began shouting. The court directed her to be quiet,
and, when she continued to shout, ordered the bailiff to remove her from
the courtroom. She resisted the bailiff's attempt to remove her and other
bailiffs came to his assistance. At that, other persons in the courtroom came
to the aid of Caref and a melee broke out.
Id.
86. Id. at 222-23, 282 N.E.2d at 2-3.
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relied on extrinsic evidence to convict the other codefendants.17
The Jashunsky defendants appealed their convictions, arguing
that the trial court had acted improperly in finding them guilty of
direct contempt, 8 as opposed to indirect contempt, for which, as a
matter of due process, they were entitled to formal hearings. 9
In the case of an indirect contempt citation, the accused must be
afforded notice and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in a
fair hearing.90 In contrast, direct,, contempt allows for summary adjudication. 91The Jashunsky court held that Jashunsky and Caret were
87. Id. at 223, 282 N.E.2d at 3. The court stated that:
[t]he defendants were charged with direct contempt, and not guilty pleas
were accepted by the court from each of the defendants. In every case except
that of Jashunsky, the court heard testimony presented by police officers
and deputies who had been in the courtroom at the tim of the disturbance ....

It appear[ed] that in Jashunsky's case the court intended to hear

the testimony of a police officer and that of Jashunsky. The court said it
would hear any witnesses Jashunsky had to offer even though, he explained:
'I personally saw Albert Jashunsky grab-lean over the rail and strike the
officer. * * * I can send you [Jashunsky] to jail immediately.' However,
when Jashunsky interrupted a ... witness by demanding an attorney and

declaring his innocence, the court stopped the hearing, declaring that
Jashunsky's conduct was 'contemptuous and in utter disregard of the judicial
process.' He was found guilty of direct contempt of court. The other
defendants were permitted to testify at their individual hearings and some
of them cross-examined witnesses who appeared against them ....

At

Caref's hearing the court, after hearing the testimony of a police officer,
stated that it had seen Caref begin the disturbance by shouting and ignoring
the court's order for silence and had seen her resisting officers who were
endeavoring to escort her from the courtroom.
Id. at 222-23, 282 N.E.2d at 2-3.
88. Id. at 221-23, 282 N.E.2d at 2-3.
89. Id. at 223, 282 N.E.2d at 3.
90. People v. Ziporyn, 121 Il. App. 3d 1051, 1055, 460 N.E.2d 385, 388
(1984), citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971).
91. Id. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1948), which states:
Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due process of law
... requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the
charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way
of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and
have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way
of defense or explanation. The narrow exception to these due process
requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the
presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the
essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are
actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential
to prevent 'demoralization of the court's authority' before the public. If
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not deprived of due process because the court's personal observations
of their contemptuous actions supported a finding of direct contempt.
The actions of the other codefendants, however, only amounted to
indirect contempt and thus necessitated due process requirements
92
which were not met.

Jashunsky illustrates the factors which have traditionally been
considered in determining whether particular contemptuous conduct
constitutes direct or indirect contempt, i.e., whether the conduct
occurred in the "presence" of the court and whether the court's
adjudication of the contempt required it to consider evidence other
than that contained within its own personal knowledge. 93 Although
the application of these factors should logically give rise to fixed,
relatively precise distinctions,9" this has not always been the case.
It appears, first of all, that the Illinois courts draw a distinction
between conduct which occurs in the "actual" presence of the court
and conduct which occurs in the "constructive" presence of the

some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the
judge, so that he must depend upon statements made by others for his
knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires ...

that the

accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing.
Id. at 275-76. See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971); People v.
Waldron, 114 Ill. 2d 295, 500 N.E.2d 17 (1986); Aurora Stell Prod. v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 94 Ill. App. 3d 97, 418 N.E.2d 492 (1981).
92. 51 Ill. 2d at 224, 282 N.E.2d at 4, citing People ex rel. Melendez v.
Melendez, 47 Ill. 2d 383, 266 N.E.2d 327 (1971); People v. Gholson, 412 Il1. 294,
298-99, 106 N.E.2d 333, 335-36 (1952); Durkin v. Hey, 376 Ill. 292, 33 N.E.2d 463
(1941).

93. See, e.g., People v. Hagopian, 408 111. 616, 97 N.E.2d 782 (1951); People
v. Javaras, 51 111. 2d 296, 281 N.E.2d 670 (1972).
94. The distinctions should be drawn as follows: (a) direct contempt consists
of conduct occurring in the "presence" of the court which can be summarily punished
due to the fact that the court need not hear extrinsic evidence in order to establish
the occurrence and nature of the contumacious conduct; and (b) indirect contempt

consists of conduct which did not occur in the "presence" of the court and/or which
requires the court to hear extrinsic evidence in order to establish the occurrence and

nature of the contumacious conduct. See, e.g., IV W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: ON PUBLIC WRONGS 287-88 (1962). At least one decision
has added an additional factor, however. People v. Randall, 89 I11.App. 3d 406, 411
N.E.2d 1017 (1980), held that a direct contempt is not only 'one which takes place
in the very presence of the judge, making all of the elements of the offense matters
within the personal knowledge of the judge"' but must, in addition, involve conduct
'tending directly to obstruct and prevent the administration of justice"'. Id. at 411,
411 N.E.2d at 1020, quoting People v. Jashunsky, 51 111. 2d 220, 223-24, 282 N.E.2d
1, 3-4 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1973).
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court. 95 People v. Andalman96 is an early decision applying this

distinction. Samuel J. Andalman, an attorney, was held in contempt

of court for filing pleadings in a habeas corpus proceeding after the
court had ordered that no such filing should occur. 97 Andalman
appealed the conviction, arguing "that the contempt of court, if any,
was an indirect contempt". 98 The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the "immediate presence of the court" includes con-

temptuous acts committed in any constituent part of the court. 99 The
court held that Andalman's conduct was a direct contempt of court,
and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.1°°

95. See, e.g., J. Bassit, Lawyer Contempt of Court: Attorney Conduct, Illinois
Institute of Continuing Legal Education §§ 3.8-3.10 (1985).
96. 346 I11. 149, 178 N.E. 412 (1931).
97. Andalman represented a divorced woman whose husband was "confined in
the county jail of Cook county for contempt of court in failing to pay alimony in
accordance with a decree of the superior court of that county." Id. at 150, 178 N.E.
at 413. The husband, Michael J. Healy, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
"alleging that the order committing him to the county jail was void." Id. Andalman
served notice that he would appear before the judge before whom the habeas petition
was pending, and would then and there "'present a petition on behalf of Violet
Healy for leave to intervene"' in that proceeding. Id. at 151, 178 N.E. at 413.
Andalman appeared before the court, but the presiding judge, Judge McKinley,
refused to entertain the petition "unless he was shown some authorities to the effect
that Andalman's client had a right to intervene." Id. After Andalman persisted,
Judge McKinley ordered "Andalman not to file the papers and the minute clerk not
to receive them." Id. In disregard of the court's order, Andalman filed the papers
with the court clerk's office, thereby avoiding Judge McKinley and his minute clerk;
when the judge learned of Andalman's actions, he held Andalman in direct contempt
of court and sentenced "him to be confined in the county jail one hundred and
twenty hours." Id.
98. Id. at 152, 178 N.E. at 414.
99. Id., citing People v. Cochrane, 307 I11. 126, 138 N.E. 291 (1923), where
the court stated:
The right to punish an offender for a contempt of court is a right inherent
in the superior court of Cook county ... and when the act constituting
such contempt is committed in the presence of the court, the court has a
right to deal summarily with the offender and without hearing any evidence
punish the offender. In such case the court acts upon view and upon its
own knowledge.... A contempt committed in any place set apartfor the
use of any constituent part of the court during the session of the court is
committed in the presence of the court, and any conduct constituting a
contempt in the presence of any one of the constituent parts of the court
while engaged in the business devolved upon it by law is a contempt
committed in the immediate presence of the court.
346 I11.at 153, 178 N.E. at 414 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
100. 346 I11. 149, 178 N.E. 412 (1931). The court did, however, remand with
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Six years later, in In re Kelly's Estate, 01 the Illinois Supreme

Court relied upon Andalman in affirming an order holding six defendants in direct criminal contempt of court "by the probate court of

Cook county and sentenc[ing] [them] to imprisonment in the county

jail for the period of one year."0 2 The defendants allegedly presented
a document to the probate court which was not the will of the named
decedent. 03 After receiving the petition the court heard the testimony
of the six persons named in the petition. The court also listened to
the testimony of other witnesses, including Waitches, who had declared himself willing to testify. Both the probate judge and counsel
for the public administrator questioned each witness.'4 During the

course of this interrogation, "Waitches admitted that he personally
presented the false will to the presiding judge in his courtroom for
the purpose of inducing him to enter orders making that document a
part of the record on the same day he caused it to be filed in the
clerk's office." 0 5
These admissions notwithstanding, Waitches appealed his contempt citation. 1 6 The supreme court affirmed stating that while the
instructions "to impose a fine upon" Andalman in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment, which had been set aside by the appellate court in an earlier appeal. Id. at
152-53, 178 N.E. at 413-14.
101. 365 I11.
174, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1937).
102. In re Kelly's Estate, 365 I11.
174, 175, 6 N.E.2d 113, 114 (1937).
103. Id. at 174, 6 N.E.2d at 114.
James Thomas Kelly, a resident of Chicago, died on February 26, 1935.
Eight days later .... Waitches filed an application for letters testamentary

in the probate court of Cook County. This application was signed by Bella
Butman and Radis.... Waitches appeared on the same day before the...
judge of the probate court, and exhibited to him a document purporting to

be Kelly's last will and testament .... Raids and Mrs. Butman were named
executor and executrix .... Waitches was named as attorney for the estate,

and it fixed his compensation for legal services to be rendered in that
capacity. Waitches and the
[probate court's] courtroom
of court a verified petition
The petition ... charge[d]

other [defendants] . . .were brought into the
on the following morning .... At the opening
. . . was presented to . . .the probate court.
... that certain acts of the six defendants

constituted a direct contempt against the court. In particular, the petition

alleged that the document presented to the court by Waitches ... was not
the last will and testament of Kelly ... and that each person named in the

Id.

petition knew, not only at the time of presentation but prior thereto, that
the document was a forgery. The petition asked the court to require the
defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 175-76, 6 N.E.2d at 115-16.
106. Id. at 176, 6 N.E.2d at 114.
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contemptuous act did not occur in the presence of the judge, fraud
was committed against the court because the act had occurred in an
area "set apart for the constituent part of the court."'' 7 Because the
contempt occurred outside the presence of the judge, extrinsic evidence
was essential to substantiate the charge.' 0
Kelly's Estate is something of an anomaly insofar as it appears
to controvert the fundamental proposition that direct contempt exists
whenever contemptuous conduct occurs in the court's presence and
can be sanctioned without the necessity for entertaining extrinsic
evidence. Andalman is distinguishable in this regard, for Andalman's
conduct was in direct derogation of an explicit order from the court.
Once the court had been apprised of the fact that Andalman's petition
to intervene had been filed with a court clerk, no further evidence
was necessary in order to support a finding of contempt; in other
words, the fact of Andalman's contemptuous conduct was apparent
from the face of the record in that action, the existence of the petition
to intervene conclusively establishing Andalman's contumacious conduct. ,09
107. The document itself was apparently of such a character that the court
became suspicious. The investigation which followed disclosed an "attempt to pervert
the process of the court." Id. at 180, 6 N.E.2d at 116. In an omitted passage of the
opinion, the Court in Andalman stated "[tihe contention was made on review, as
here, that the contempt of court, if any, was an indirect contempt and that the rules
governing such contempts should apply." Id. at 181, 6 N.E.2d at 116. Having made
this observation, the Court then disposed of the contention by quoting the Analman
holding concerning "conduct . . .in the presence of any one of the constituent parts
of the court." Id.
108. Id. at 180, 6 NE.2d at 116. The court continued as follows:
In the Andalman case, as in the present case, the contempt consisted of
filing papers in the office of the clerk of the court. It was accordingly
necessary for the trial judge in that case, as in this case, to be informed
that the contemner [sic] had filed the papers in question in the clerk's office
and that the defendant personally filed them. Neither contempt was of such
a character as to be apparent to the ocular or auditory senses of the judge
of the court. Manifestly, if the contempt committed in the office of the
clerk of the superior court was a direct contempt, the contemptuous conduct
of Waitches in the office of the clerk of the probate court was likewise
direct.
Id. at 181, 6 N.E.2d at 116.
109. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan, 67 Ill. 2d 55, 364 N.E.2d 50
(1977) (direct contempt for defense counsel in a pending criminal proceeding to file
a civil action against the presiding judge). As a further illustration of the point,
assume that an attorney files a pleading with a court; assume, further, that the
pleading in question contains racial, religious and/or sexual epithets which are
specifically addressed to the judge who is presiding over the proceeding in which the
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Kelly's Estate, however, is not so easily distinguished, particularly
since the fact of the contempt was not apparent from the face of the
document is submitted. In such an instance, the act of filing the pleading is an act
of direct contempt which occurs in a "constituent part of the court." Although act
upon which a contempt citation would be predicated, i.e., the act of filing the
document with the court clerk, did not occur in the actual, physical presence of "the
court", i.e., of the presiding judge of that court, the act was "of such a character
as to be apparent to the ocular ...

senses of the judge of the court." That is,

because the offensive material was contained within the body of the pleading, and
because the offensive character of the material was apparent upon perusing the
document, no recourse to extrinsic evidence was necessary in order to establish the
nature and occurrence of the contumacious conduct. Because recourse to extrinsic
evidence was not necessary to establish the contempt, it constitutes a direct contempt
and may be punished as such. See, e.g., 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 28 (1963) ("Contempt
may arise out of the filing of papers in court, as where the papers are filed in a
disrespectful manner, or are of such a nature as to show disrespect for the authority
or dignity of the court. Thus, contempt may be committed by incorporating impertinent, scandalous, insulting or contemptuous language reflecting on the integrity of
the court in pleadings.").
As this illustration suggests, the preferable factor to be utilized in ascertaining
whether contempt is direct or indirect is the issue as to whether extrinsic evidence is
necessary in order to establish the occurrence of contemptuous conduct. People v.
Ziporyn, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 460 N.E.2d 385 (1984), illustrates the validity of this
proposition. In Ziporyn, a defendant who had been convicted of murder was in court
for a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether he should receive the death penalty.
Id. at 1053, 460 N.E.2d at 386. After the defendant had taken the stand and had
been cross-examined "vigorously" by Assistant State's Attorney Garza, he took
advantage of a bench conference to walk over to the counsel table at which Garza
was seated. Id. at 1053, 460 N.E.2d at 386787. When Garza ignored the defendant's
efforts to gain his attention, the latter whispered a "vile epithet" to Garza. Id. The
"vile epithet was brought to the court's attention only when Garza jumped up,
repeated the remark in a louder than conversational tone in front of the jury and all
those present, and demanded that defendant be held in contempt of court." Id.
After a hearing at which Garza and several other witnesses testified, the defendant
was "found guilty of indirect criminal contempt and sentenced to one year misdemeanor probation." Id. The defendant appealed the conviction, and the appellate
court reversed for reasons which are not relevant to the point presently under
consideration. Id. at 1060, 460 N.E.2d at 391. The opinion is, however, significant
in that the court found that the defendant's conduct could only be characterized as
constituting indirect contempt because "the allegedly contemptuous conduct occurred
outside the presence of the court, i.e., defendant's conduct was neither heard nor
seen by the trial judge." Id. at 1055, 460 N.E.2d at 388. The trial judge's actual
physical presence in the courtroom at the time the remark was made was not
dispositive; what was dispositive was that extrinsic evidence was required in order to
establish the occurrence of the conduct and its contemptuous character. See id.
Another decision reached a similar result: People v. Randall, 89 Il1. App. 3d
406, 411 N.E.2d 1017 (1980), involved a defendant who, seeking to have a bond
forfeiture set aside, filed a letter with the court stating that he had been hospitalized
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record in that proceeding but, as is noted in the passage quoted
immediately above, was established only after the court heard extrinsic
evidence in the form of testimony from those to whom the .rule to
show cause had been issued." 0 At first blush, the taking of extrinsic
evidence in support of a finding of direct contempt, predicated upon
an act committed "in the presence of a necessary constituent part of
the court instead of in the immediate presence of the judge," would
appear to be an absolute contradiction of the principles which were
adduced at the beginning of this portion of the discussion."'
It appears, however, that it may be possible to reconcile Kelly's
Estate with these principles; the reconciliation can be predicated upon
either of two premises: (a) because Waitches admitted his perfidy, the
conduct was punishable as direct contempt; and/or (b) the taking of
extrinsic evidence in Kelly's Estate was a function of an antiquated
and since-discarded contempt procedure which gave the appearance
of utilizing extrinsic evidence when, in point of fact, this was not the
case. Support for the first premise appears in a decision which the
Illinois Supreme Court entered thirty-two years after Kelly's Estate,
i.e., In re Estate of Melody." 2
The defendant in Melody, Pauline Owens, was convicted of
criminal contempt and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for her
transgressions." 3 Like those of Mr. Waitches, Ms. Owens' transgressions also involved the "filing of [a] spurious will" with the probate

on the date of the forfeiture. Id. at 407-08, 411 N.E.2d at 1018. "The court, after
examining the letter, concluded that the letter was a forgery and, . . . without

granting a hearing or receiving any evidence, found the defendant guilty and sentenced
him to six months in jail." Id. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court
reversed. The court concluded that the trial court had denied the defendant due
process by summarily finding him in direct contempt when "[tihe falsity of the
document was not . . .a matter within the trial court's personal knowledge." Id. at

413, 411 N.E.2d at 1022. The trial court made an independent inquiry and ascertained
that the treating physician's name was misspelled on the letter. Id. at 409-10, 411
N.E.2d at 1019. The appellate court held that because extrinsic evidence was necessary
in order to establish the falsity of the letter and, thereby, the occurrence of
contemptuous conduct, the defendant's conduct could only be characterized as
indirect contempt, which required that he be accorded all the incidents of due process
in the proceeding at which his contempt was adjudicated. Id. at 409-15, 411 N.E.2d
at 1019-22.
110. Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill. at 177-78, 6 N.E.2d at 114-15.
111. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
112.. 42 Ill. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 104 (1969).
113. Id. at 452, 248 N.E.2d at 105.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

division of the circuit court of Cook County." 4 It appears that, like
Mr. Waitches, Ms. Owens chose to admit that she had been responsible for having a "spurious will" filed with the probate court of
Cook County.
Such admissions are of profound significance if the filing of
"spurious pleadings" is analyzed as if it constitutes a form of
perjury." 5 The Illinois Supreme Court considered the issue of perjury

114. Id.
Although defendant did not do the actual filing of the will, it was she who
was the instigator of the entire plan, which had as its purpose the admission
to probate of a spurious will. Her part included not only obtaining the
lawyer to draft and probate the spurious will, but obtaining and coaching
persons to commit perjury as attesting witnesses before the probate division ....

The fact that the scheme 'blew up' after counsel offered the will

for probate, when the court on motion of one of the heirs appointed an
amicus curiae to investigate the conditions attending its execution, and that
her part of the scheme was not committed in the physical presence of the
court, did not make her conduct any less a criminal contempt of the ...
court. Her acts, committed outside the presence of the court, could certainly
be deemed indirect contempt. Since such indirect contempt was admitted, it
may be punished as a direct contempt.
Id. at 453, 248 N.E.2d at 106 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The attorney
whom Ms. Owens, "a practical nurse for the decedent," retained to draft and file
the spurious will was named S. Edward Bloom; Mr. Bloom appealed his contempt
conviction and twenty-four month sentence to the Illinois Supreme Court, which
reversed and remanded for a jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968).
See also People v. Bloom, 35 Ill. 2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 475 (1966), cert. granted, 386
U.S. 1003 (1967), rev'd sub nom., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
115. See, e.g., 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 28 (1963) ("filing false papers in court").
Perjury is defined as "[tihe willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief,
or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence,
either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether
such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion
being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness to be
false." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Therefore, if a pleading
is executed under oath and includes false statements as to "a matter of fact, opinion,
belief, or knowledge ... being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known
to such witness to be false," then such conduct would appear to constitute a form
of perjury; and if the essence of perjury is construed as being an attempt to impede
the legitimate administration of justice by submitting false allegations and or evidence,
then the absence of the oath would not appear to constitute a serious impediment to
the analysis which is suggested above, i.e., that contemptuous conduct consisting of
the intentional submission of false pleadings is most appropriately analyzed as if it
were a form of perjury. See, e.g., Fred Nemerovski & Co. v. Barbara, 106 Ill. App.
2d 466, 246 N.E.2d 124 (1969) (one who wilfully swears to a pleading, knowing it to
contain false statements as to material facts, may thereby commit perjury).
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in People-v. Harrison.116 Harrison arose out of a divorce proceeding
in which "the three plaintiffs in error [Ernest A. Harrison, Jeanette
Harrison and Joseph Harrison] testified to a certain act of cruelty
allegedly committed by Maria Harrison against Ernest A. Harrison
on July 10, 1947, at their home.""' 7
Ernest A. Harrison had sued his wife "for a divorce on the
ground of extreme and repeated cruelty."" 8 After she did not enter
an appearance, a default decree was entered granting the divorce." 9
The wife, Maria Harrison, then filed a petition to set aside the decree
and, after leave was granted, filed an answer and a counterclaim for
2
separate maintenance.1 0
On May 14, 1948, the judge from the original divorce proceeding
entered an order, naming the plaintiffs in error, for a rule to show
cause for direct contempt. At the contempt hearing Margery Quandt,
the medical records librarian at Wesley Memorial Hospital, testifed
that Maria Harrison had been a patient at the hospital and under
observation on July 10, 1947, the date of the alleged act of cruelty.' 2'
After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered an order finding
"the plaintiffs in error guilty of direct criminal contempt for uttering
false and perjured testimony and passed sentence upon them."' 2 2
The three Harrisons appealed their convictions and the Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that "the summary method by which the
trial court sought to punish plaintiffs in error denied them due process
of law."' 23 The court concluded that the trial court had erred in
characterizing the Harrisons' conduct as direct contempt: "[W]here
the record shows the falsity of the witness was not known to the court
at the time [of the testimony], but the fact was developed by a
subsequent inquiry, a charge of direct contempt cannot lie.' 1 24 .'In
116.
117.
118.
119.

403 Ill. 320, 86 N.E.2d 208 (1949).
Id. at 322-23, 86 N.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 322, 86 N.E.2d at 209.
Id.

120. Id.

121. Id. at 323, 86 N.E.2d at 209. "Records substantiating this were also
introduced . . . [and] Maria Harrison . . .testified . . .that she had been confined
to the hospital on July 19, 1947; and that she did not, on that date, commit any act
of cruelty against her husband." Id. at 323, 86 N.E.2d at 209-10.
122. Id. at 323, 86 N.E.2d at 210.
123. Id. at 328, 86 N.E.2d at 212.
124. Id. at 325, 86 N.E.2d at 211, citing People v. Stone, 181 Ill. App. 475
(1913); People v. LaScola, 282 Ill. App. 328 (1935); Butwill v. Butwill, 312 Ill. App.
218, 38 N.E.2d 377 (1941). After noting that a direct criminal contempt "has been
defined by this court as being one which takes place in the very presence of the
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a case of direct contempt, [the court] may act upon that of which it
may take judicial notice, but it cannot judicially know that evidence
is false unless at the trial it is so made to appear by the witness's own
admission or perhaps by unquestioned and incontrovertible evi125
dence. '1
When perjury, false swearing or failure to comply with a court
order is admitted, it is punishable as direct contempt.126 Because
Waitches and Owens admitted their respective indulgences in perjurious conduct, i.e., the filing of "spurious wills" which were intended
to deceive the Cook County probate court, their conduct was punishable as direct contempt.
But if that is the case, then why did the court in Kelly's Estate
proceed to take testimony from witnesses other than Waitches? The
answer lies in the often arcane intricacies of the contempt procedure
which was in effect at the time Kelly's Estate was decided.
In William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England,
these common law contempt procedures are described:
If the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the
offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the
discretion of the judges, without any farther proof or examination. But in matters that arise at a distance, and of which
the court cannot have so perfect a knowledge, unless by the
confession of the party or the testimony of 'others, if the
judges upon affidavit see sufficient ground to suspect that a
contempt has been committed, they ... make a rule on the
suspected party to shew cause why an attachment should not
issue against him .... This process of attachment is merely
intended to bring the party into court: and, when there, he
must ... answer upon oath to such interrogatoriesas shall be
administered to him .... If the party can clear himself upon

judge, making all of the elements of the offense matters within his own personal
knowledge", the court concluded that the Harrisons' conduct could not constitute
direct contempt: "In the instant case, the alleged contempt occurred in the very
presence of the court, but it is questionable whether all elements of the offense were
matters within the personal knowledge of the judge. The alleged false swearing was
not admitted and was dependent for its proof on extrinsic evidence." 403 Ill. 320,
325, 86 N.E.2d 208, 210 (1949) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 326, 86 N.E.2d at 211 (emphasis added), quoting People v. Stone,
181 11.App. at 477.
App. 3d 35, 508 N.E.2d 1233 (2d Dist.
126. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 156 I11.
App. 3d 856, 415 N.E.2d 1354 (1981).
1987); Matter of Swan, 92 Ill.
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oath, he is discharged; but, if perjured, may be prosecuted
27
for the perjury.1
This passage describes the doctrine of "purgation by oath", which
was in force in Illinois until 1952,128 when the supreme court held that
the doctrine would no longer be followed in the state of Illinois. 129
This means, of course, that the doctrine was in effect at the time
Kelly's Estate was decided.
The opinion in Kelly's Estate indicates that after the petition for
the issuance of a rule to show cause was filed with the court, it
"proceeded to hear the testimony of the six persons named in the
petition as well as the testimony of other witnesses."' 3 0 It is clear that
127. IV W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND:

Of Public

Wrongs 287-88 (1962). In a subsequent passage, Blackstone criticizes this practice:
[Tlhis method of making the defendant answer upon oath to a criminal
charge, is not agreeable to the genius of the common law in any other
instance ....

[In the equity courts], after the party in contempt has answered

the interrogatories, such his answer may be contradicted and disproved by
affidavits of the adverse party: whereas, in the courts of law, the admission
of the party to purge himself by oath is more favourable to his liberty,
though perhaps not less dangerous to his conscience; for, if he clears himself
by his answers, the complaint is totaly dismissed.
Id. at 288. An Illinois author described the doctrine in the following terms:
Developed as a reaction to the Star Chamber Court and its methods, the
defense was a perversion of canon law, which worked to emasculate the
inherent power of a court because it allowed the contemner to trade the
slight risk of a trial for perjury to overcome the court's power to punish
for contempt.

Note, Contempt-Power to Punish and Proceedings Therefor, 31 CII-KENT L. REV.
181, 182 (1953), citing Curtis, The Story of a Notion in the Law of Criminal
Contempt, 41 HARV. L. REV. 51 (1921). See also Note, Contempt-Doctrine of
"Purgation by Oath" Overruled in Illinois, 2 DEPAuL L. REV. 105 (1952-3).

128. See, e.g., People v. Rongetti, 344 Ill. 107, 176 N.E. 292 (1931); People v.
McLaughlin, 334 Ill. 354, 166 N.E. 67 (1929); People v. McDonald, 314 Ill. 548, 145
N.E. 636 (1924). The United States Supreme Court had rejected the doctrine some
years before. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932).
129. See People v. Gholson, 412 IIl. 294, 106 N.E.2d 333 (1952), aff'g, 344 IIl.
App. 199, 100 N.E.2d 343 (1951). The court stated that "[tihe doctrine of 'purgation
by oath' will no longer be adhered to by this Court and all previous decisions of this
Court upholding and applying that doctrine, in that respect, are hereby expressly
overruled." 412 Il. at 303, 106 N.E.2d at 338.
130. In re Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill. at 177, 6 N.E.2d at 114. The court found that
the purported will of Kelly was not witnessed until after his death; the court further
found that all of the parties involved were aware of this fact and were scheming to
perpetrate a fraud upon the court; the court held all of the parties involved in
contempt of court and sentenced them to serve one year in the county jail. In re
Kelly's Estate, 285 Ill. App. at 146, 1 N.E.2d at 906.
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Waitches testified and that he "admitted . . that he personally
presented the false will to the presiding judge in his courtroom for
the purpose of inducing him to enter orders making that document a
part of the records of the probate court.

....

,,.31

It is also clear that Waitches' appeal from his conviction was
based upon the following argument: "Waitches contends that an
indirect contempt was charged in the petition upon which the proceeding originated, and that, in consequence, he should have been
M
discharged upon his oral answer denying the charges against him."'
The supreme court rejected the argument because it found that the
contempt was direct; it appears that the court predicated its finding
that the contempt was direct, rather than indirect, upon the fact that
Waitches "admitted filing the spurious will and the verified petition
seeking letters testamentary."

33

Waitches' argument was apparently based upon the contention
that, although he had admitted filing the spurious will and the petition
for letters testamentary, there was no evidence to establish that, in so
doing, he had intended to perpetrate a fraud upon the court. 3 4 It also
appears that Waitches had testified that "he knew nothing about the
preparation of the forged will.'" 3 The Illinois Supreme Court found
this, together with the fact that Waitches had been acting as an officer
131. 365 Ill. at 180, 6 N.E.2d at 115-16. Although six defendants were "adjudged
guilty of contempt of court" in the proceeding that led to Waitches' appeal, it was
his writ of error, and his writ of error only, that was at issue in In re Kelly's Estate.
See id. at 175-76, 6 N.E.2d at 114. At least one other defendant, Nicholas Radis,
also prosecuted a writ of error; his conviction, too, was affirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court. In re Estate of Kelly, 365 Ill. 194, 6 N.E.2d 118 (1937).
132. 365 Ill. at 178, 6 N.E.2d at 115. Waitches also argued that the petition for
issuance of the rule to show cause was substantively deficient, and that "the sentence
... [was] void because the record [did] not recite any jurisdiction over him and [did]
not show that he was present when sentence was passed." Id. at 183, 6 N.E.2d at
117. The supreme court rejected both arguments. Id.
133. Id. at 184, 6 N.E.2d at 117. See also supra notes 105-08 and accompanying
text. This conclusion finds additional support in the court's opinion in Kelly's Estate
II, which affirmed Nicholas Radis' conviction based upon the fact that he, too, had
admitted his participation in Waitches' scheme to probate the "spurious will." From
the testimony of defendant Radis, it appears that he knew that the will filed in the
probate court was a forgery; he testified that he did not know and had never heard
of the decedent, that he saw the will for the first time when Mrs. Butman (the
executrix) gave it to him for the purpose of obtaining Zalinck's signature as an
attesting witness thereto, and that Zalinck signed the document as a witness in his
presence and at his request. Id. at 195, 6 N.E.2d at 118-19.
134. Id. at 183-84, 6 N.E.2d at 117.
135. Id. at 184, 6 N.E.2d at 117.
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of the court at the time he filed the documents in question, sufficient
to establish "that Waitches had knowledge of the sordid circumstances
attending the execution of the false will despite his protestations to
36
the contrary."1
Courts should require that practicing attorneys have a higher
regard for the administration of justice than that which is
required of the layman. Utter disregard of attorneys as to the
truth or falsity of matters contained in papers and documents
presented to courts warrants condemnation as unethical and
contemptuous. . . .If the acts of a contemner are inconsistent
with the alleged intention, and if the acts charged and proved
or not denied amount to a contempt, the answer averring
[that] the party charged 'intended no contempt will not purge
37
him. 1
This finding is based upon practice under the doctrine of purgation by oath. Under that doctrine, "the sworn answers of [a] defendant fully denying the alleged contempt are conclusive, entitling him
to a discharge."' 38 However, if the conduct constitutes contempt
regardless of the defendant's lack of intent then no disavowal by
sworn statement will discharge the contempt citation.' 3 9
136. Id.
137. Id. at 184, 6 N.E.2d at 117-18, citing People v. Sherwin, 334 11. 609, 166

N.E. 513 (1929) and People v. Burr, 316 Ill.
166, 147 N.E. 47 (1927).

138. 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 83(b) (1963) states that:

In cases where intention is an element of the offense . . . a defendant is

... entitled to be discharged on filing a sworn answer which sufficiently
disclaims or disavows any intention to commit contempt. Even where [the]
defendant admits the commission of the acts with which he is charged, where
his answer explains his actions in such [a] way as to show that no contempt
was intended, he must be discharged unless his answer is insufficient as a mat-.
ter of law....
Id. (footnote omitted). See also People v. Gholson, 412 Il.294, 297, 106 N.E.2d
333, 335 (1952).
139. See 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 83(b) (1963). It is suggested that
[a] defendant is not entitled to a discharge on filing a disclaimer of intent
under oath if the conduct relied on as constituting the offense amounts to
a contempt regardless of want of intention. Thus a direct contempt, where
the offense involves the personal presence and overt acts of defendant in
open court, is not purged by a disavowal of intent under oath.
Id. (footnotes omitted). It is further stated that "a sworn disclaimer of intent is
unavailing even in cases where intention is an element of the offense charged, if the
alleged contemptuous acts are unambiguous and subject only to the one reasonable
construction that a contempt was intended." Id. (footnote omitted), citing In re

Kelly's Estate, 365 Ill.
174, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1937).
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The import of Kelly's Estate is evident: Waitches' "testimony"
(and, perhaps, the testimony of his fellow miscreants as well) was
actually the "answer" by which he sought, under the doctrine of
purgation by oath, to discharge the contempt proceedings which had

been instituted against him. Since an answer in a contempt proceeding

may be oral, 14° and Waitches' answer was an oral answer, 14' then

Kelly's Estate did not involve either (a) the taking of extrinsic evidence
to establish the fact of a direct criminal contempt consisting of the
act of filing "spurious" documents with the court, or (b) a finding
that the filing of "spurious" documents with the court is a direct
criminal contempt which can be summarily determined and sanctioned
without the necessity for hearing extrinsic evidence. What Kelly's
Estate did involve was the following legal scenario: Waitches filed

"spurious" pleadings with the probate court. Upon the issuance of a
rule to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for that
filing, Waitches responded with an oral answer in which he admitted

the act of filing the "spurious" pleadings but denied (a) that he knew
that the documents were fraudulent, and/or (b) that the filing was
attended by any intent to defraud the court.

42

Waitches believed that

his answer was sufficient to discharge the proceeding because he
believed he was being held to answer to a charge of indirect criminal

contempt.

43

140. See 17 C.J.S. Contempt §83(a) (1963). See also People v. McDonald, 314
Ill. 548, 145 N.E. 636 (1924). McDonald was accused of striking Goldstein in an area
outside of Judge Sullivan's court, and was arrested by Judge Sullivan's bailiffs at
Goldstein's insistence. Id. at 549, 145 N.E. at 636. Judge Sullivan interviewed both
parties and the bailiffs; McDonald denied the assault, and none of the bailiffs had
actually witnessed his striking Goldstein. Id. at 549-50, 145 N.E.at 636. Only Goldstein
could connect McDonald with the assault. Id. at 550, 145 N.E. at 636. Judge Sullivan
proceeded to hold McDonald in direct contempt of court, and sentenced him to sixty
days in the county jail. Id. at 550, 145 N.E. at 637. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the contempt was not direct because it was not committed in the
court's presence and/or so near as to interrupt the proceedings of the court. Id. at
551, 145 N.E. at 637. Thus, the supreme court held, it was improper to issue a
finding of contempt absent a full hearing on the matter; the court also held that, in
proceedings for contempt which was not committed in the court's actual physical
presence, an answer denying the wrongful act is held to be conclusive. Id. at 552,
145 N.E. at 637. If the answer is later proven to be false, the remedy is an indictment
for perjury. Id.
141. "Waitches contends., that .. , he should have been discharged upon his
oral answer denying the charges against him." 365 I11. at 178, 6 N.E.2d at 115
(emphasis added). See also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
142. 365 Il1. at 183-84, 6 N.E.2d at 117.
143. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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What Waitches did not realize, however, was that by admitting
the act of filing the "spurious" pleadings he transformed the proceeding into a proceeding for direct criminal contempt in which the
issue of intent was inferrable from the act of filing such pleadings. 144
Having done so, his attempt to rely upon the doctrine of purgation
by oath was unavailing, and he was convicted of direct criminal
contempt for conduct which was analogous to that involved in the
145
commission of perjury in open court.
Kelly's Estate is, therefore, not an anomaly in the Illinois law of
contempt, but instead supports the propositions adduced in an earlier
section of this discussion, i.e., that direct contempt can be prosecuted
summarily upon the court's own knowledge but that because indirect
contempt requires the presentation of extrinsic evidence to establish
the underlying contemptuous conduct, it must be prosecuted in accordance with the dictates of due process. The following discussion
explains how the parties in the Smith proceeding attempted to turn
these propositions to their respective advantage.

144. 365 Ill. at 183-84, 6 N.E.2d at 117. As noted above, since the act of filing
false and fraudulent pleadings with a court must be conceptualized as analogous to
the act of committing perjury, the admission of the underlying conduct is sufficient
to transform the contempt into a direct, rather than an indirect contempt. See supra
note 111 and accompanying text. Once such an admission has been made, it is then
permissible to infer the necessary intent from the fact of communicating false
assertions in a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 156 Ill. App. 3d 35,
508 N.E.2d 1233 (2d Dist. 1987); People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan, 67 Ill. 2d 55, 364
N.E.2d 50, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1023 (1977); In re Willis, 57 Ill. App. 3d 378, 373
N.E.2d 77 (1978).
It is also possible to predicate the Kelly's Estate holding upon another, associate
proposition: "While the filing of a false pleading is not contempt ....

an attorney

may be held guilty of contempt where he shows an utter disregard for the genuineness
of documents presented in court, or for the truth of falsity of matters contained
therein." 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 28 (1963) (footnote omitted), citing In re Kelly's
Estate, 365 I11.174, 6 N.E.2d 113 (1937). See also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
145. As noted earlier, perjury is indirect contempt if the falsity of the testimony
is not admitted, but is punishable as direct contempt if the falsity is admitted. See,
e.g., In re Estate of Melody, 42 Ill. 2d 451, 453, 248 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1969). The
rationale is, of course, the necessity to entertain extrinsic evidence in adjudicating
the merits of the contempt allegations. By the same token, Waitches committed an
act which, although not committed in open court, but rather committed within a
"necessary constituent part of the court", involved the communication of false
allegations to that court. By admitting the underlying conduct at issue, Waitches
eliminated the necessity for entertaining extrinsic evidence and thereby permitted the
court to transform the proceeding into an action for direct contempt.
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SMITH ARGUMENTS

The first issue upon which the parties to the Smith proceeding
disagreed was whether the filing of a fraudulent petition for reinstatement, assuming arguendo that such a petition had been filed, constituted civil or criminal contempt. Smith and his erstwhile representatives
argued that, even if one assumed for the purposes of argument that
such a petition had been filed with the court, it would constitute, at
most, an act of civil contempt. They predicated their argument upon
the nature of the hypothesized conduct and the nature of the "harm"
which it was presumed to inflict: The Smith parties contended that
the offensiveness of such a petition, again assuming that it existed,
lay in the act of having submitted it to the court for its consideration.
They then asserted that the appropriate action to be taken with respect
to this presumed offense would be to withdraw it from the court,
thereby "purging" any contempt which might, for the purposes of
argument only, have been assumed to attend its submission to that
august body.
In making this argument, the Smith respondents relied upon the
proposition that the appropriate remedy for civil contempt is to permit
the alleged contemnor to purge himself of his contemptuous conduct, 146 and upon a provision of the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility.' 47 Rule 7-102(b)(1) of the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility provides as follows:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that
... his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected
14
as a privileged communication. 1
Smith and those who had represented him during the drafting
and filing of the petition argued that even assuming, arguendo, that
the petition was factually imperfect in contravention of the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 767,149 the appropriate response would
be to "rectify" those imperfections by withdrawing the petition. They
suggested that Rule 7-102(b)(1) articulates a purgation requirement
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra Section II(A).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, Rule 1-101 through 9-102 (1985).
Id. at Rule 7-102(b)(1).
See supra notes 2-3.
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which is applicable in any instance in which fraud, or factual misstatements, have been submitted to an Illinois court.
The Administrator rejected the Smith argument, asserting (a) that
the petition for reinstatement was "riddled with fraud and falsehood,"
and (b) that the fraudulent nature of the petition rendered its filing
with the Illinois Supreme Court an act of criminal contempt, an act
against the dignity of that court. The Administrator argued that the
perpetration of the fraud, and the offense against the court, was
complete with the act of filing the petition, so that purgation was
inapposite; the Administrator also pointed out that it is not possible
to purge criminal contempt. 5 0
The Administrator also argued that the act of filing the petition
for reinstatement was an act of direct criminal contempt, and should
be sanctioned as such. The Administrator denied the necessity for
according Smith and his former attorneys the dictates of due process,
such as the opportunity to put in evidence controverting the allegations
that the petition was false and fraudulent, and argued that the court
could punish the alleged malfeasance summarily.
The Administrator based this portion of his argument upon the
fact that he had submitted a number of exhibits as attachments to his
motion for sanctions and/or for a contempt citation. The Administrator contended (a) that these exhibits conclusively established that
the petition was fraudulent, and (b) because these exhibits were a part
of the record in the proceeding, it was possible to adjudicate Smith's
criminal contempt on the basis of the record that was before the
court, with no recourse to extrinsic evidence being necessary.
In support of this argument, the Administrator relied heavily
upon the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kelly's Estate. 5 ' The
Administrator urged that Kelly's Estate stands for the proposition
that the filing of a fraudulent document with an Illinois court is direct
contempt and may be sanctioned as such.
Without conceding that the filing of the petition could constitute
criminal contempt, Smith and his attorneys countered the Administrator's argument by asserting that even if the petition were fraudulent, its filing could only be characterized as indirect contempt, the
adjudication of which required that they be provided the opportunity
to respond to the Administrator's allegations as to the falsity of that

150. See, e.g., Estate of Schlensky, 49 Ill. App. 3d 885, 364 N.E.2d 430 (1977);
People v. Gray, 36 I11.App. 3d 720, 344 N.E.2d 683 (1976).
151. See supra Section II(B).
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document.'5 " Smith and his attorneys asserted that, rather than conceding that the petition for reinstatement was false, they were prepared
to produce evidence which established that the assertions contained
therein were accurate in every material respect.
Since they refused to admit that the petition for reinstatement
was false, Smith and his attorneys argued that the filing of the
document could only be construed as constituting a possible act of
indirect contempt, the existence of which required that they be permitted the opportunity to appear and adduce evidence in their own
behalf. The Smith parties relied upon the distinction presented in §
III(B), supra, for the proposition that Kelly's Estate does not permit
the conclusion that the filing of a document, which is alleged to be
fraudulent, constitutes direct criminal contempt and may be punished
as such.
Fortunately or unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court did
not have occasion to adjudicate the arguments presented as to the
import of its decision in Kelly's Estate, as subsequent events rendered
the controversy moot.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has utilized a hypothetical scenario to consider the
application of Rule 2-611 to attorney disciplinary proceedings and has
argued that the provision cannot apply in the absence of an order to
this effect entered by the Illinois Supreme Court. The article has
utilized the same scenario in considering the applicability of the
contempt sanction to the filing of fraudulent documents with an
Illinois court of record, and has demonstrated that the decision in In
152. As primary support for his allegations of "fraud and falsehood," the
Administrator had relied upon the testimony of two former attorneys who attacked
the information and statements contained in Smith's petition. The sworn statements
of these two attorneys constituted the exhibits which had been attached to the
Administrator's motion and upon which he based his contention that the record in
the proceeding was sufficient to permit the adjudication of the matter summarily, in
a proceeding. for direct contempt. After the parties had submitted their briefs on this
issue to the court, however, the Administrator learned, through independent sources,
that the two witness-attorneys had perjured themselves in an attempt to discredit Mr.
Smith; their attempt to discredit Mr. Smith was the result of resentments produced
from what they considered wrongs that had been done them in the past. Once the
Administrator realized that his action against Smith was, itself, the product of
perjured testimony, he disclosed this fact to the court and petitioned for the dismissal
of the proceeding. The court granted his petition, and dismissed the proceeding with
orders that Smith should be allowed to reinstate at his discretion.
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re Kelly's Estate does not support the characterization of such conduct
as constituting a species of direct criminal contempt.

